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Ever since the 1995 Okinawa rape incident, the relationship between Okinawa 
and Japan and the United States has soured. Hoping to amend local discontent, in 
1996, both governments agreed on relocating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to 
Camp Schwab, Henoko bay within five to seven years. Interestingly, the two-decade 
old agreement to establish the Futenma Relocation Facility on Henoko bay has not 
occurred. Although the societal, environmental and security concerns regarding the 
Okinawa base problem are not completely ignored, existing literature fails to analyze 
and circumvent the reasons behind delay. 
This thesis contributes to debate by addressing why the Henoko relocation has 
stalled for the past twenty years. Loosely applying Putnam’s Two-Level Game 
Analysis, this thesis will present the argument that the United States of America and 
Japan, believing that security takes precedence over Okinawa interest, knowingly 
engaged in negotiations given the poor prospects in Okinawan consent. Negotiations 
were determined to be time consuming and difficult from the beginning due to the low 
win-set as revealed by initial Okinawan resistance.  
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1. The Futenma Relocation Problem 
When referring to the United States of America’s position in Asia, the alliance 
with Japan is indispensable for America. For Japan, the alliance with America 
symbolizes Japan’s commitment to the post-WWII system and therefore remains its 
strongest alliance to this day. According to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the 
alliance between the two countries is an “alliance of hope.”1 While the relationship 
between the two countries is strong and coherent, there remains a thorn that prickles 
both parties: the Okinawa base problem. 
The problem originates from the 1995 Okinawa rape incident.2 Unlike previous 
military related crimes, the inhumane brutality imposed on a twelve-year old girl by 
three Marine soldiers caused uproar in Okinawa Prefecture. This particular case 
permeated both Japanese and Western mainstream media. In hopes to amend local 
contestation, both governments agreed on relocating Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS) Futenma out of Ginowan City within five to seven years in 1996. After 
agreement, both governments announced that the Futenma Relocation Facility (FRF) 
would be relocated to Henoko, the bay adjacent to Camp Schwab located in Nago City, 
Okinawa. This proposal received immediate backlash from the oppositions, claiming 
                                                
1 Abe Shinzo, “ ‘Towards an Alliance of Hope’ – Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress 
2 Andrew Pollack, “Marines Seek Peace With Okinawa in Rape Case,” The New York Times, last 





that relocation within the prefecture betrays the promise of “reduc[ing] the burden of 
the people of Okinawa.”3 With opposition stemming from Okinawa, the status of 
relocation has since inched forward slowly yet steadily, at times shelved due to lack of 
options.  
Immediately after the American and Japanese government initiated discussions 
on the future of the Futenma base, the LDP successfully concluded a compromised 
facility with Okinawa governor Keiichi Inamine. Unfortunately, resistance by the 
locals forced the central government to reconsider the 2002 blueprint. This led to the 
creation of the 2006 blueprint, which Inamine refused to accept as an alternative. 
Inamine’s successor accepted the new blueprint in principle but desired modifications. 
The alliance rejected the new mayor’s proposals. As a result, Okinawan governor 
Hirokazu Nakaima resisted relocation. Ultimately, the LDP failed to use these 
opportunities to their advantage. 
The base problem took a significant swing with the Democratic Party of Japan’s 
(DPJ) electoral victory in 2009. A month before the elections, Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama declared to relocate the FRF out of the prefecture and announced his will to 
reevaluate the 2006 roadway plan. Despite his promise, within a year of leadership, the 
new Prime Minister reneged his plan of relocation while citing security concerns. The 
politically liberal party failed to change the situation. 
                                                
3 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996,” Ministry of 




Relocation gained momentum under the second Abe administration. 
Surprisingly, Nakaima accepted relocation in 2013, which led to his defeat in the 2014 
Okinawa gubernatorial elections. The new governor, Takeshi Onaga, resists against the 
FRF. Legal permission to proceed with the relocation did not urge the Abe 
administration to take immediate action. After series of political conflict, the Abe 
administration began the procedure of inserting concrete block on sea ground in 
February 2017 and completed the bedrock of the FRF within a month.4 The logistics of 
the relocation problem may come to an end sooner or later. The Supreme Court has 
recently strengthened the LDP’s justification for constructing the Henoko base with 
Okinawa Prefecture’s defeat at court.5 It is likely that the Japanese government would 
successfully create the FRF in Henoko bay amidst of Okinawan opposition.  
2. Puzzle and Importance of the Issue 
Okinawa’s location is strategically crucial for the American military. The island 
is located 350 nautical miles from Taiwan, 670 nautical miles from South Korea, 830 
nautical miles from Tokyo and 990 nautical miles from Beijing.6 As stated in the 1960 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the military’s presence on the island 
allows the United States to defend and maintain the security of the Asia-Pacific. Home 
                                                
4 “Finishing Inserting Blocks, The Aim to Avoid Criticism of Henoko Base Construction’s as 
‘Illegal’ [Buroku no touka kanryou Henoko shin kichi kouji ‘ihou’ shiteki sakeru neraika],” Okinawa 
Times, last modified on April 1, 2017, accessed on July 3, 2017, http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-
/91249.  
5 Yutaka Chiba, “Henoko, Okinawa’s Defeat Confirmed Supreme Court Decision Government 
leaning towards restarting construction [Henoko, Okinawaken no haisokakutei, saikousaiban hanketsu 
seifu, kouji saikai houshin],” The Asahi Shimbun, December 21, 2017. 
6 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, “The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the 
Futenma Base Controversy,” Congressional Research Services, last modified on January 20, 2016, 
accessed on July 2, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf, 4-5. 
 
4 
to roughly 70 percent of American bases in Japan, the strategic importance of Okinawa 
is undeniable. 
Yet local residents have questioned the presence of the American military. 
Antagonism and skepticism towards American presence continue since Okinawa’s 
reversion back to Japanese jurisdiction on 15 May 1972. Both American and Japanese 
governments have reduced military presence since reversion. The decision to return 
Futenma base with 11 other facilities back to Okinawan jurisdiction has been the 
greatest endeavor towards burden reduction. However, reversion of Futenma base has 
stalled for the past twenty years. What has hindered the construction of a facility that 
was proposed over twenty years ago? This puzzle continues to be dismissed and 
observers have instead discussed the implications of the new base. If the significance 
of the stalemate between the central governments and local government is not 
understood, antagonism will continue to accumulate. International security may also be 
negatively affected if the problem remains unaddressed. Even if relocation occurs 
against the local government’s opposition, remorse will remain for at least a 
generation. This will result as continued attention towards American and Japanese 
mishandling of the problem. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the base 
relocation debate by delving into the reasons why relocation has been postponed for 
the past twenty years. 
 
5 
3. Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into three sections. The first part of the thesis introduces 
the theoretical overview for the Okinawa base problem. Six main arguments relating to 
the reasons behind delay in relocation is introduced and critiqued. As most literature 
related to Okinawa lacks a theoretical framework, the author presents and defends the 
usage of Robert Putnam’s Two-Level Game Analysis for analyzing stagnation. The 
section will conclude with the methodology of the thesis. 
The second part of the thesis theoretically scrutinizes the historical development 
of the twenty-year statement in three different stages: (1) 1996-2006, (2) 2009-2010, 
and (3) 2013 and beyond. The first stage (1996-2006) provides readers with 
background information on the origins and evolutions of both the base problem and the 
FRF construction plans. The second period (2009-2010) delves into former Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his challenge against the United States of America. 
Although his tenure lasted for only nine months, he was the first Prime Minister to 
attempt the Futenma base relocation from the prefecture but failed. The third period 
(2013 to 2017) analyzes the current administration’s initiatives in relation to the 
problem. Unlike previous administrations, relocation has most advanced under Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe. This period also sees greater mobilization of anti-base sentiment 
under current Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga. Each historical narrative will be 
explained using Putnam’s theory. 
The third part of the thesis conducts a comparative analysis of all three periods. 
This section clarifies Okinawa’s position on the Futenma base relocation. American 
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and Japanese actions that negatively affects Okinawa’s win-set are introduced. After 
clarifying the positions of the alliance and the local government, the paper answers 
why relocation has stagnated since 1996. This section concludes with suggestions that 





II. Theoretical Overview 
1. Literature Review 
While literature on the Okinawa base problem exists, most focus on the effects 
and implications of the problem rather than analyzing the essence of the base problem 
per se. For example, leading American security academics such as Michael Green and 
Mike Mochizuki argues over the strategic importance of the new base and the presence 
of the Marines.7 Professor at Okinawa International University Hiromori Maedori et al. 
argue how the US-Japan SOFA Agreement is the fundamental reason why bases 
continue to be located in Okinawa.8 Envail and Ng question whether the Okinawa 
problem could affect US-Japan relations.9 Robert D. Eldridge, recipients of the Suntory 
Prize for Social Sciences and Humanities and Yasuhiro Nakasone Award, wrote how 
the Okinawa base problem has been exacerbated by exaggerations made by Okinawan 
media, thus perpetuating resistance.10 Unfortunately, most available literature questions 
other aspects of the Okinawa base problem rather than questioning the issue of 
                                                
7 Michael J. Green et al., “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence and Partnerships,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified on January 19, 2016, accessed on November 
22, 2016,  https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf; Kyoji 
Yanagisawa, et al., The Virtual Image of Deterrence [Kyozou no yokushiyoku]  (Tokyo: Kyouji 
Yanagisawa, 2015). 
8 Hiromori Maedori, Toru Aketagawa, Eiichiro Iwayama, and Kouji Yabe, The U.S.-Japan Status 
of Force Agreement that is more Important than the Constitution: Introduction [Hontowa kenpo yori 
taisetsuna nichibei kyoutei nyumon] (Tokyo: Sogensha, 2013). 
9 David Envall and Kerri Ng, “The Okinawa ‘Effect’ in US-Japan Alliance Politics,” Asian 
Security 11.3 (2015): 225-241. 




stagnation. Therefore, the author accumulated the following six commonly shared 
arguments scattered within existing literature.  
The first argument presents that Okinawa deliberately prolongs negotiation for 
greater financial gains. As evidence, conservative Okubo and Shinohara (2015) argue 
that the local construction company lobbied towards the Japanese government for 
greater financial gains, resulting in modifications of the 2006 blueprint.11 Eldridge 
(2016a) argues that prolonged opposition would naturally force the government to 
continue financial aid.12 Unfortunately, this argument emphasizes the role of few 
stakeholders (e.g. landowners) rather than the Okinawa as a whole. As the paper will 
reveal, opinion polls conducted by the central government, prefectural government and 
NHK reveal a general consensus against the FRF, suggesting that financial income is 
not an important reason behind delay.13  Despite the threat to decrease financial 
assistance, Okinawa, under Onaga, continues to fight against relocation. Therefore, 
while there may be entities that seek greater benefits, financial income alone cannot 
explain delay in relocation. 
The second argument asserts that internal division within Okinawa explains the 
slow process of relocation. Envail and Ng (2015) argue that political pluralization, 
defined as “increasing competition between political groups over the values or 
objectives that the state should be pursuing”, hampers speedy relocation. 14  This 
                                                
11 Jun Okubo and Akira Shinohara, The Inconvenient Truth of Okinawa [Okinawa no futsugouno 
shinjitsu] (Tokyo: Shinchosa, 2016), 17-18, 33. 
12 Robert D. Eldridge, Okinawa Theory [Okinawa Ron] (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2016), 165-166. 
13 Refer to Chapter IV 1.3. 
14 Envall and Kerri, 227. 
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argument solely places blame on the local Okinawan government and in result 
dismisses the role of the United States and Japan. In addition, the paper fails to explain 
why relocation has not occurred when Okinawa was united under the Hatoyama and 
second Abe administration. The current situation reveals that political pluralization is 
not sufficient reason for stabilization  
While Yoo (2014) agrees with Envial and Ng, she presents the third argument 
that the flippant position of governors contributes to delay.15 She argues that both 
Inamine and Nakaima have contradicted with their initial intensions to compromise 
with the central government. However, with closer observation, Inamine was 
consistent with his stance of relocation. 16  Once his relocation conditions were 
abandoned by the central government, he declined to cooperate. On the other hand, the 
relocation lenient governor Nakaima desired modification to the 2006 blueprint. The 
alliance rejected his proposal. He turned into an anti-base advocate and only changed 
his mind during his last year of governorship. Therefore, he was consistently hesitant 
towards the government’s proposal for seven years. 
The fourth argument attributes blame to the Hatoyama administration’s action 
for disrupting the long procedure of negotiation and allowing skepticism to erupt 
towards the government. Moritomo (2010), former aid to the Japanese Minister of 
Defense under the Aso administration, wrote an insider view to the Okinawa base 
relocation problem. Although his stated purpose was to analyze why Futenma has not 
                                                
15 Hyon Joo Yoo, “When Domestic Factors Matter: The Relocation of US Bases in Okinawa,” The 
Korean Journal of International Studies 12.2 (2014): 404.  
16 Refer to Chapter III 1.3 and 1.4. 
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been relocated, he merely provided a historical account and failed to explain why 
relocation has not occurred during the first ten years of the LDP government.17 The 
trends of voting preferences in Okinawa’s gubernatorial election prove that anti-base 
preferences did not have a significant change during the DPJ government.18  
Miyagi and Watanabe (2016) represent the fifth argument that the governments’ 
initiative was insufficient to address the burdens of Okinawa and contradict the spirit 
of the 1996 agreement. They quote Gerald Curtis’ comment that “the Okinawa base 
problem is like a time bomb” to describe the unaddressed burden of the Okinawans.19 
They effectively presented Okinawa’s burden but failed to connect it to reasons behind 
the deadlock.  
The sixth argument is the Marine Corps’ agenda to protect their own interests. 
Looking at the Futenma relocation problem from a critical perspective of the United 
States, Wright (2010) argues, “Crucial to understanding the impasse at Futenma is the 
infighting and favoritism that occurs among the various branches of the U.S. 
military.”20  He claims that favoritism towards the Marines explains the lack of 
consideration towards base consolidation with Kadena Air Base and that “[s]imple as it 
may be, I believe that Okinawa’s ideal location, climate, and recreation facilities also 
pay a role in ensuring that MCAS Futenma will continue to haunt the people of 
                                                
17 Satoshi Morimoto, The Mysterious Twists in the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma 
Relocation Plan [Futenma no Nazo] (Tokyo: Kairyusha, 2010), 7. 
18 Refer to Chapter IV 1.4. 
19 Gerald Curtis quoted in Taizo Miyagi and Tsuyoshi Watanabe, Futenma Henoko The Distorted 
20 Years [Futenma Henoko yugamerareta 20 nen] (Tokyo: Shueisha Shinsho, 2016), 216. 
20 Dustin Wright, “Impasse at MCAS Futenma,” Critical Asian Studies 42.3 (2010): 465. 
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Ginowan for a long time.”21 While Wright’s presentation of internal military politics is 
interesting, it distracts from addressing the issue of reducing Okinawan burden by the 
American and Japanese governments.  
The previous six arguments are important facets of the relocation problem. 
Unfortunately, the arguments fail to explain the fundamental issue. Loosely applying 
Putnam’s Two-Level Game Analysis, the author will argue that America and Japan 
(Level I), believing that security takes precedence over Okinawa interest (i.e. overall 
reduction of base presence), knowingly engaged in negotiations given the poor 
prospects in Okinawan consent (Level II). Negotiations were determined to be time 
consuming and difficult from the beginning due to the low win-set as revealed by 
initial Okinawan resistance.  
2. Theoretical Framework 
Recognizing the intricate relation between diplomacy and domestic actors, 
Robert Putnam (1988) developed the Two-Level Game Analysis to explain how 
international and domestic actors affect the other. According to Putnam, both domestic 
and international constituents are driven by self-interest and seek to maximize gains 
through negotiation.22 In his original theory, domestic actors pressure the national 
government to act accordingly to their will. The national government is expected to 
confront and appease domestic interest through negotiation with other governments. 
Putnam categorizes negotiation between governments on the international stage as 
                                                
21 Ibid.. 
22 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization 42.3 (1988): 434. 
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Level I and negotiations within a country as Level II.23 Putnam labels the range of 
internal consent as win-sets; the larger the win-sets in both countries in negotiation, the 
likelihood of agreement increases. Therefore, “By definition, any successful agreement 
must fall within the Level II win-sets of each of the parties to accord.”24 
Ratification of negotiations can fail due to voluntary and involuntary defection. 
Voluntary defection refers to the rational choice of the government to renege from 
negotiations.25 Involuntary defection refers to the government’s failure to execute 
agreements due to domestic contestation. In order to avoid either defection, it is 
important to understand how win-sets can be modified.  
Putnam introduces three factors that affect win-sets. First, the preferences and 
coalitions among Level II constituents affect the size of win-sets. If Level II actors are 
internally divided, Level I actors need only to appease the majority of Level II actors.26 
Homogeneity among Level II actors can negatively affect the possibility of 
international consensus due to a constricted Level II conditions. Interest among Level 
II constituents could also involve many areas, ranging from financial gains to 
environmental protection. Because preferences cannot be easily changed, incentives 
agreed upon Level I that provide favorable benefits to domestic actors may positively 
affect negotiation. This issue linkage is labeled as synergistic linkage.27 The second 
                                                
23 Ibid., 436. 
24 Ibid., 437-438. 
25 Ibid., 438-439. 
26 Ibid., 444. 
27 Ibid., 447. 
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factor is Level II institutions, which refers to the type of governance.28 The difference 
of political institutions and power distribution among different domestic constituents 
can also affect win-sets, such as the power difference between states, territories, and 
prefectures. The third factor is the Level I negotiators’ choice of strategy, which 
includes media utilization and language choice.29  
Two out of three additional factors that affect negotiations are important for this 
thesis. If Level I negotiators are placed in a similar position, negotiators must convince 
a proposal that is slightly in advantage or disadvantage for one party to strike a 
negotiation. 30  Governments can also pressure the opponents to accept certain 
negotiations, resulting in reverberation within their counterpart’s domestic politics.31 
While Putnam asserts that international pressure can theoretically expand win-sets, he 
also agrees that domestic backlash may occur.  
The Futenma relocation problem consists of three actors: the American 
government, Japanese government, and the local Okinawan government. The clear 
division of interest between the central governments and the local government proves 
that Putnam’s theory is appropriate. The case of Okinawa proves interesting as the two 
central governments (Level I) are united without question and are working towards 
convincing Okinawa in accepting the relocation (Level II). The domestic political 
institution limits Japanese leverage because any form of forcible construction without 
the Okinawa governor’s consent will be interpreted as a rejection of democracy. As 
                                                
28 Ibid., 448-449. 
29 Ibid., 450-452. 
30 Ibid., 453. 
31 Ibid., 454-456. 
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mentioned in the previous section, the thesis argues that the win-sets of the alliance 
and Okinawa were limited and never overlapped. Therefore, even before negotiations 
began, the schism between the two parties predetermined consensus as unlikely to 
occur in the near future. 
3. Methodology 
In order to analyze the history of the Okinawa base problem, the paper refers to 
existing literature and news articles to properly address crucial events that occurred in 
the past twenty years. Works conducted by Okinawan historian Moriteru Aragaki and 
Satoshi Moritomo is utilized for understanding events that occurred from 1996 until 
the end of the Hatoyama administration. The Asahi Shimbun is the main source of 
reference for events from 2013 and to present American, Japanese and Okinawan 
perspectives.  
Both American and Japanese incentives are scrutinized through an analysis of 
governmental documents and official comments made by both governments. Okinawan 
incentives are examined through Okinawan related literature, current Okinawa 
governor Onaga’s speeches and book, and public opinion polls. For the sake of clarity, 
the positions of America and Japan are combined and analyzed as one entity. The 
evolving conditions or win-sets are observed throughout the thesis.  
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III. Disrupted Promises and Delayed Implementation 
1. Disguised Compromises: From the 1995 Rape to the 2006 
Roadmap 
1.1 Background to Agreement of Futenma Base’s Relocation 
Problems between American soldiers and locals were a problem both under 
American control and after Okinawa’s reversion on 15 May 1972. According to the 
Okinawa Prefecture Police Department, crimes committed by American soldiers from 
1972 up to 1995 amounted to 4790 different incidents, significant crimes including 12 
murders, 355 cases of theft, and 31 cases of rape.32 Regardless of previous criminal 
offenses on multiple occasions, the rape of the middle school girl conducted by three 
American soldiers on 4 September 1995 changed the situation of base politics.33 In 
response, the Okinawa Prefecture Civilian Demonstration (Okinawa Kenmin Soukekki 
Taikai) occurred on 21 October 1995, which amounted to 85,000 participants. Both 
Japanese and Western media reported the incident, and mass demonstrations 
manifested Okinawan discontent. 
Hoping to ease tensions as soon as possible, the Japanese and American 
government established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) during 
November 2015. After multiple debates and discussions, both governments jointly 
                                                
32 Aragaki, 158. 
33 Pollack, “Marines Seek Peace With Okinawa in Rape Case.”  
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published the SACO Final Report on 2 December 1996.34 The American government 
promised to return 11 facilities, one of them being MCAS Futenma.35 While 11 
facilities will be returned, both governments agreed to relocate Futenma base during 
the next five to seven years within the prefecture rather than moving it out of Okinawa. 
As an alternative for Futenma, in January 1997, both governments proposed Henoko, 
Nago city as the host of the new FRF. The decision to return Futenma base was 
surprising. While burden reduction has been on both U.S. and Japanese agenda since 
Okinawa’s reversion, most of the reversions focused on smaller bases rather than large 
facilities such as Futenma. It is also important to realize that in 1993, the local 
government announced three important factors they deemed most necessary: the return 
of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield and the halt of parachute 
practices, and the halt of Artillery live-fire training over Okinawa Prefecture Highway 
104.36 It can be concluded that the Americans and Japanese were ambitious in efforts 
to reduce burden by addressing both two out of the three demands and simultaneously 
including the reversion of Futenma. 
                                                
34 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The SACO Final Report.”  
35 The 11 facilities are of the following: Futenma, 4000 hectares of Camp Gonsalves (Northern 
Training Area), Aha Training Area, Gimbaru Training Area, Sobe Communications Site, Yomitan 
Auxiliary Airfield, Senaha Communications Station, Camp Kuwae (also known as Camp Lester), 
Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and housing consolidations on Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran 
(also known as Camp Foster).  “Okinawa Beigun Kichi Henkan Keikaku,” Nippon.com, last modified on 
April 25, 2013, accessed on December 31, 2015, http://www.nippon.com/ja/features/h00028/. 
36 Morimoto, 42. 
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1.2 The Level I Agreement Between the United States and Japan 
Following the announcement of relocating the Futenma base, both American and 
Japanese government looked at different bases and debated over the preferred 
destination. The Japanese government understood that relocating the base out of the 
prefecture was strategically implausible given its geographic location.37 Out of all 
speculated host destinations, in July 1996, the Japanese government proposed merging 
Futenma to Kadena Air Base would be preferable as one executive member of the 
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) explained, “Residents of Okinawa would most likely 
accept relocating the base to an already existing facility rather than creating a new 
runway.” 38  The United States rejected the proposal. According to the American 
militray, the consolidation of different Marine and the Air Force’s aircrafts could 
increase the likelihood of aviation navigation accidents.39 In response to America’s 
explanation, one of the executive members of the JDA retaliated, “It is not possible to 
simply accept [this explanation] without any data presented. [The Japanese 
government] will continue pressing for the Kadena proposal until the end.”40 This 
development is extremely interesting, as another executive member of the JDA further 
                                                
37 Ibid., 106-107. 
38 Anonymous executive member of the JDA quoted in “Government to Negotiate with America 
with Considerations for Okinawa: Proposal of Consolidating Futenma’s Heliport to Kadena [Futenma 
helipoto no Kadena heno kyushuteian Okinawagawa ni hairyo seifu to bei koushou],” The Asahi Shimbun, 
July 27, 1996. Translated by author. 
39 “Stalemate on Negotiations for U.S. MCAS Futenma’s Relocation: The Government Stalled 
against the United States [Taibei Okinawa meguri, seifu tachi oujyou Beigun Futenma kichi iten, 
susumanu hanashiai],” The Asahi Shimbum, July 28, 1996. 
40Anonymous executive member of the JDA quoted in “Continued Stalemate between the United 
States and Japan on Relocation of the Heliport: Okinawa MCAS Futenma Relocation [Kouchaku tsuzuku 




claimed, “The United States doesn’t fully understand the difficulty of the Okinawa 
Problem. Rejecting consolidation with Kadena Air Base could possibility lead to 
rejection of the American military and result as expulsion from the whole island.”41 
With plans to finish concrete planning by November, the Japanese and American 
continued negotiations. Staying true to their concerns, the Japanese bureaucrats 
readdressed the importance of considering creating a facility within Kadena base.42 As 
previously mentioned, the Japanese government presented their proposal as “an option 
that has possibility of Okinawan consent.”43 As expected, the United States repeated 
their concern of aviation navigation. American negotiators also raised concerns of 
further burden on Kadena Air Base and the possibility of growing noise pollution. 
However, unlike their attitude in the summer of 1996, the American negotiators 
accepted the Kadena alternative as an alternative to the Futenma base. With America 
proposing a new alternative of creating a sea-based facility (SBF), both governments 
came to an agreement to consider creating a new facility within the Kadena Air Base, a 
facility at Camp Schwab, or a SBF.44 Although the parties agreed to come to a 
conclusion on the destination of the facility, as seen in the SACO Final Report released 
on 2 December, all alternatives were listed as options to be further examined.45 This 
was soon reversed on 16 January 1997 when Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku 
                                                
41 Anonymous executive member of the JDA quoted in Ibid. 
42 “Delayed to the U.S.-Japan Summit, The SACO Team and the MCAS Futenma Kadena 
Consolidation Proposal [Shunou kaidan he sakiokurimo SACO sagyou bukai Futenma hikoujyou Kadena 
kyushuan],” The Asahi Shimbun, September 14, 1996. 
43 Ibid. 
44 “SACO to Agree on Three Alternatives including a Sea-Based Facility: MCAS Futenma 
Relocation [Kaijyouan fukume 3 an ni shiboru nichibei tokubetsu koudouiin de goui beigun Futenma 
hikoujyou iten],” The Asahi Shimbun, September 18, 1996. 
45 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996.” 
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Kajiyama announced that both governments agreed to uphold Henoko bay as the 
alternative claiming, “There is no other alternative.”46 Given the lower population in 
Nago City and possible increase of noise pollution in Kadena, the alliance concluded 
Henoko as the better option.47 
 As seen in the development of deciding the location for the FRF, the Japanese 
government fought for creating the facility within the already existing Kadena Air 
Base. Although critics may like to believe that Japanese politicians simply succumbed 
to American pressure, the government’s endeavor cannot be simply ignored. The 
Japaenses government correctly understood that any alternative other than the Kadena 
proposal would engender further contestation.  
 On the Level I platform, the Japanese government failed to convince the 
American government in accepting their Kadena proposal. Negotiations between the 
United States and Japan reveal three conditions that the Americans deemed as 
important: to relocate Futenma within Okinawa, to not consolidate the FRF to an 
existing facility, and to maintain the equal level of security. Although Japan knew 
Okinawa’s low win-set and warned their counterpart of resistance, Japan failed in 
persuading America to expand their win-set. Mutually understood necessity of security 
and America’s intransigent position on relocation led to a Level I agreement. The 
alliance engaged Okinawa amidst acknowledging their low win-set. 
                                                
46 Seiroku Kajiyama quoted in “Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama to announce that 
Schwab Bay is also a candidate: Report to the American Military [Shuwabuoki, Kajiyama kanbouchoukan 
mo kouho to meigen beigun he ripoto],” The Asahi Shimbun, January 17, 1997. 
47 Morimoto, 127. 
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1.3. The 2002 Blueprint: Taking Okinawa’s Demands into 
Consideration 
Demonstrations occurred throughout the year of discussion, as it soon became 
apparent that the Futenma reversion required creating another facility within the 
prefecture.48 American military facilities that could serve as hosts for relocation were 
all over Okinawa. Therefore, it is not surprising that those living in the Nago City, the 
proposed relocation destination, protested against the suggestion. As protest gained 
momentum, the Nago City Mayor decided to conduct a referendum about Henoko on 6 
June 1997. This particular incident experienced a voter turnout of 82.45 percent.49 
Those who approved the construction amounted to roughly 45 percent, while those 
who opposed amounted to roughly 52 percent. Unfortunately, the referendum was 
meaningless. To everyone’s surprise, during December, the Nago mayor suddenly 
decided to accept the relocation and left office the following day.50 Tateo Kishimoto, 
the new mayor, announced that he would follow the decision of the Okinawan 
governor. After the Nago City referendum, Governor Masahide Ota resisted further 
development of relocation. However, Keiichi Inamine, candidate who was more 
flexible on relocation, won the 1998 Okinawa gubernatorial election against Ota, 
former governor against Henoko. It seemed as if things were going in favor of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. 
                                                
48 “Okinawa to Anger against FRF Once Again Against All Potential Candidates [Okinawa, 
Daitaikichi ni Ikari Futatabi Dono Kouhochimo Ukeire Hantai],” The Asahi Shimbun, July 17, 1996. 
49 Aragaki, 186. 
50 “Mayor Higashicho to Resign [Higashicho ga Jiyou Teishutsu],” Ryukyu Shimpo, last modified 
on December 26, 1997, accessed on December 3, 2016, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-90396.html. 
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As an alternative to Futenma, the alliance initially agreed to create a sea-based 
facility. When discussing the nature of the new base, the U.S. military proposed the 
Mobile Offshore Base (MOB), a floating platform that can freely move in bodies of 
water.51 The mobile facility could be placed at a respectful distance from local 
residents. In addition, the facility could be easily dismantled if further usage was 
deemed unnecessary. However, this model is technologically advanced and 
demanding, and remains technologically implausible to this day. The Japanese 
researched the possibility of creating a mega-float base by using the Quick Installation 
Platform (QIP).52 Like the MOB, a mega-float base created with the QIP methodology 
was attractive because it can support the infrastructure with several piles, and thus is 
easier to dismantle when the base is deemed as unnecessary. The usage of piles also 
allows water to flow under these floating bases and is less environmentally hazardous 
when compared to a landfill. 
With different outlooks of base creation, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi 
announced on 11 November 1998 that the government would reconsider the agreed-
upon MOB alternative as the FRF.53 With discussions of what an alternative could look 
like, a year later on 23 November 1999, Okinawan governor Inamine accepted Henoko 
as the location for the relocation facility with the conditions of a fifteen-year lease and 
                                                
51 Morimoto,159. 
52 Ibid., 165. 
53 “Okinawa On-Sea Base Under Unavoidable Review Government Leaders’ Outlook [Okinawano 
kaijyou kichian wa mitoushi fukahi Seifushuno ga mitoushi],” The Asahi Shimbun, November 11, 1998. 
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usage of the new facility as a joint military-civilian airport.54 While the fifteen-year 
lease was not fully embraced by the alliance, the Obuchi Administration agreed with 
the cabinet decision “Government Policies Regarding the Relocation of the MCAS 
Futenma” on 28 December 1999.55 
This cabinet decision resulted in the development of the Futenma Relocation 
Facility Conference, which allowed Okinawan and affiliated Japanese government 
cabinet ministers to engage in negotiation regarding the construction methodology and 
location of the FRF. Starting from 28 December 1999, the conference concluded 
negotiation by 29 July 2002 over a span of nine meetings. 56  With both U.S. 
government and Japanese government showing less interest in the American-proposed 
MOB and Okinawan negotiators believing that the new facility would be a joint 
military-civilian airport on a fifteen-year lease, the Japanese and Okinawan politicians 
came to the conclusion of landfilling the FRF.  
Unlike the current plan, Japan and Okinawa agreed to landfill the seabed 2.2 
kilometers away from Henoko, Nago and 0.6 kilometers from Hirajima.57 With a base 
far from the city, noise pollution and contact with the Okinawans would significantly 
decrease, and a landfill would prove economically beneficial for local companies. 
After 15 years, Okinawa expected full usage of the runway. Contray to Okinawan 
                                                
54 “ ‘American Military Usage for 15 Years” Governor Inamine Continuing Request regarding the 
Futenma Air Base Relocation Site [Beigunshiyou wa 15 nen Inamine chiji, yousei keizokuhe Futenma 
hikoujyou isetsusaki],” The Asahi Shimbun, November 23, 1999; Morimoto, 146. 
55 Ibid., 150-151. 
56 Ibid., 184-189. 
57 Japanese Cabinet Office, “Consideration documents based on ‘Main Points of the Direction in 
Handling the Relocation Facility Plan’ [‘Daitai isetsu kihon keikaku shuyo jikou ni kakawaru toriatsukai 
hoshin’ ni motoduku kentou shiryou],” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, last modified on 2002, 
accessed on April 17, 2017, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hutenma/dai9/9siryou1.pdf, 2.  
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belief, the American military never accepted restriction on usage. As a result, on 28 
November 2002, Prime Minister Juinichiro Koizumi and his cabinet passed the cabinet 
decision “Government Policies Regarding the Relocation of the Futenma Air Base.”58 
The Koizumi administration announced that they would discuss the duration of usage 
with the United States while heavily considering Okinawa’s conditions. This was 
purposely left vague in order to avoid conflict with the Okinawan stakeholders. 
1.4 The 2006 Blueprint: Pushing for a Speedy Relocation 
With the original deadline of five to seven years already passed, the process of 
inspection and boring survey began from 19 April 2004. This process of halted and 
ultimately failed due to demonstrations.59 The next critical accident relating American 
bases occurred during August 2004 when an American military helicopter crashed into 
Okinawa International University, located within a kilometer from MCAS Futenma.60 
Fortunately, school was out of session. This incident rekindled fear among the 
Okinawans and ignited further frustration, which manifested as the “U.S. Helicopter 
Crash 9.12 Ginowan-City Civilian Demonstration” (Beigun Heri Tsuiraku 9.12 
Ginowan Shimin Taikai) with 30,000 participants, which amounts roughly to a third of 
                                                
58  Japanese Cabinet Office, “ Main Points of ‘The Government’s Position on the Relocation of the 
Futenma Air Base’ [‘Futenma hikoujyou no isetsu ni kakaru seifuhoushin’ no gaiyou],” Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan, last modified on May 30, 2006, accessed on April 17, 2017, 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/okinawa/7/7211.html.  
59 Aragaki, 220-221; Takemasa Moriya, The Futenma Chronicle the negotiations behind the 
scenes [‘Futenma’ koushou hiroku] (Tokyo: Shinchosa, 2010), 52. 
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the city’s population.61 The uncertain situation of base-lease and infamous 2004 
Helicopter Crash Accident gave momentum for the anti-base movement. 
With friction between Okinawa and the central governments increasing whether 
related to the recent accident or misunderstandings on the nature of the new base, the 
alliance started to hint at reconsidering the already decided FRF. On 23 February 2005, 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States 
Department of Defense Richard P. Lawless revealed the necessity of finding a viable 
location for the FRF, implying that other options may be reconsidered. 62  This 
suggestion was further bolstered on 27 February when Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Nobutaka Machimura, through a Fuji Television news program, mentioned, “Whether 
options other than the Henoko [plan] exist or not. I will not reject any possibilities.”63 
Morimoto notes that intensified reanalysis of all options occurred within the LDP 
during September 2005.64 While the original plan cleared all objectives and concerns 
held by all three actors, the extensive period of construction and finance made both the 
United States and Japan to reconsider the 2002 agreement.  
Given that demonstration against environmental assessment of Henoko was 
hindering the procedure, the Japanese government under former Prime Minister 
                                                
61 Population data of Ginowan residents (89,316 at August 2004) retrieved from Okinawa 
Prefectural Government, “Okinawa Prefecture Estimated Population Data Table [Okinawaken suikei jinko 
data ichiran],” Okinawa Prefecture Statistical Document Website, accessed on April 17, 2017, 
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/toukeika/estimates/estidata.html#2004; Morimoto, 236. 
62 “America to consider alternative if proposed A Breakthrough Alternative Approaching Japan 
The Futenma Transfer Problem [Bei, daitaian dereba kentou Nihon ni daikai-saku semaru Futenma iten 
mondai],” The Asahi Shimbun, February 24, 2005. 
63 “Foreign Minister Machimura on the Futenam Relocation, Not to reject proposals other than 
Henoko [Henoko igai ‘haijyo shinai’ Beigun Futenma isetsu de Machimura Gaishou],” The Asahi 
Shimbun, February 28, 2005. 
64 Morimoto, 242. 
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Junichiro Koizumi believed that creating the base entirely on land would shorten the 
process.65 The United States government proposed to create a landfilled extension near 
Henoko City than the original 2.2 kilometers. Taking America’s proposal into 
consideration, the Japanese government argued that construction should occur partly 
on land, hoping that this would fasten the process of the already late relocation. In the 
midst of U.S.-Japan negotiations, Nago Mayor Kishimoto and Okinawa Governor 
Inamine opposed changes. Kishimoto suggested that Nago would consider the 
American proposal, However, he argued against the Japanese proposal citing potential 
danger due to proximity and noise pollution, and therefore “[the Japanese proposal is] 
100 percent no.”66 On the other hand, Inamine argued against both alternatives and 
called out to respect the initial agreement.67 Regardless of these leaders’ opposition, on 
29 October 2005, both governments put an end to the long discussion on the location 
of the new facility with an agreement to create the FRF on Henoko Bay.68 In response 
to the decision, Inamine argued, “[The 2002 agreement was decided] within the 
difficult context of relocation within the prefecture.... If not the original agreement, the 
prefecture will continue to hold firm on out of prefecture relocation.”69 
                                                
65 Ibid., 250; Moriya, 82-83. 
66 “Futenma Relocation, Okinawa Henoko Reduction Plan Appears Nago City Mayor Showing 
Hints of Admitting Proposal [Futenmaisetsu, Henoko Okinawa shukushoan ga fujyou Nago shicho, 
younin no shisei],” The Asahi Shimbun, September 21, 2005.  
67 “Not Satisfied with the Innter-Prefecture Relocation Okinawa Governor Comments on the 
Futenma Relocation [Kennaian ni nattokusezu Okinawa chiji, hatsugen fumikomu Futenma isetsu],” The 
Asahi Shinbum, October 5, 2005. 
68 Morimoto, 259. 
69 Keiichi Inamine quoted in “Nago City Mayor Officially Denouncing Futenma’s Relocation Plan 
to Henoko [Futenma no Henokosaki isetsuan, Nago shicho mo hitei seishiki hyoumei],” The Asahi 
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 Both Kishimoto and Inamine’s disapproval did not stop the governments. 
Negotiations of the blueprint occurred between the Japanese government and the new 
Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro in March 2006, and both parties came to an 
agreement of a V-way roadmap rather than the original L-way on 7 April 2006.70 The 
alliance officially announced the new blueprint through the U.S.-Japan joint 
publication of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation on 1 
May 2006. 71  Okinawa Governor Inamine responded that he would “respect the 
decision of Nago city. But the prefecture will remain to its view.”72 Starting out from 
mutual negotiation and ending in contradictory stances, decision on the location and 
blueprint were now set. Pro-relocation candidate Hirokazu Nakaima won the 2006 
Okinawa gubernatorial elections, providing confidence in speedy relocation.73  As 
originally decided in the 1996 SACO Final Report, relocation was not achieved within 
the five to seven years as promised. The new deadline was placed at 2014. 
                                                
70 Moriya, 177-186; “Agreement between the Central Government and Nago City on the Futenma 
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hatsutousen Itokazushi ni 3 man 7318 hyousa],” Ryukyu Shimpo, last modified on November 20, 2006, 
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27 
Contrary to expectations, Nakaima demanded that the new runway had to be 
located further out in Henoko bay and less partially on land.74 Lengthy negotiations 
with both the United States and the new Nago mayor resulted in the central 
government’s rejection of Nakaima’s proposal. However, resistant and obdurate as the 
previous governor, Nakaima refused to accept the new proposal if his conditions were 
not met. 
1.5 Expanding Win-sets? 
As expected, Okinawa resisted inner-prefecture relocation. The 1997 Nago City 
Referendum and Ota’s position were hurdles to the alliance’s plan. Inamine was 
determined to limit the use of the new facility by proposing two conditions. Despite 
America being hesitant, Japan believed that negotiations on Inamine’s terms were 
necessary in order to reach a consensus. While it may seem as if the alliance was able 
to change the preferences of the Okinawan government, the conditions that limited 
American use of the new base suggest that Okinawa never changed their position on 
relocation. If a new facility was necessary, Okinawa desired a facility that limits usage 
and remain under Okinawan jurisdiction. Therefore, a proper Level I and Level II 
consensus was never reached. As seen with the Koizumi administration’s cabinet 
decision, the Japanese government was intentionally vague on the term of usage in 
order to strike a deal with both America and Okinawa.  
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Failure to conduct boring surveys for the 2002 blueprint discouraged the 
Koizumi administration to continue with construction. While respecting America’s 
win-sets, Japan reexamined other alternatives that could shorten the process and 
confront less resistance. Rekindled negotiation with the United States resulted in the 
2006 blueprint. The central government decided not to discuss the specifics with the 
Okinawa governor, which resulted in Okinawa to reaffirm their win-sets. The rise of 
Nakaima was expected to be advantageous for the alliance. However, the new 
governor demanded readjustment to the blueprint, which would result in another round 
of lengthy negotiations with the Americans and Okinawans. For the first time, Japan 
and America cemented their position on the blueprint and resisted Okinawan demands. 
This resulted in a continued standoff between the Level I and Level II constituents. 
2. Great Expectations: The DPJ and Hatoyama’s Failed Attempt 
2.1 Hatoyama’s Challenge Against the Initial Level I Agreement  
All of Japanese politics took a significant swing with the DPJ’s electoral victory 
on 30 August 2009. For the first time in history, one ruling party defeated the LDP. An 
advocate against the Futenma relocation, a month before elections, Yukio Hatoyama 
declared to create the FRF out of the prefecture and announced his will to reevaluate 
the 2006 roadway plan.75 In response, a day after the DPJ’s historic victory, the 
Americans made it clear that they have no intention to renegotiate the already decided 
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plans.76 Regardless, during the second U.S.-Japan Meeting held on 13 November 2009, 
Prime Minister Hatoyama told President Barack Obama to trust him on the Okinawa 
base problem and claimed to provide an alternative to Henoko.77 A month later on 17 
December at the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference held at Copenhagen, Hatoyama 
reiterated Japan’s direction on the base problem to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.78 
Few days later, Clinton warned Japanese Ambassador to the United States of America 
Ichiro Fujisaki that a delayed relocation of the FRF “may affect the future of U.S.-
Japan relations.”79 Frustration growing in the United States prompted Hatoyama to 
announce May 2010 as the deadline of decision, and thus led to the creation of the 
Okinawa Base Problem Investigation Committee on 28 December.80  
Growing expectations and pressure from Washington intensified discussion at 
the Okinawa Base Problem Investigation Committee. A joint committee compromised 
with politicians from the DPJ, the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New 
Party. The latter two parties presented alternatives to the existing plan for the DPJ to 
consider. While the Social Democrats’ proposals were all pointed towards other 
locations within Japan other than Okinawa, the People’s New Party proposed creating 
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[Futenma ‘saikoushou shinai’ Kerry bei hodoukan, ‘Minshu seiken’ kensei],” The Asahi Shimbun, August 
31, 2009. 
77 “Prime Minister Hatoyama Revealing President Obama’s ‘I will trust you’ at the Summit 
Conference [Obama bei daitouryou kara ‘shinjimasuyo’ Shunou kaidan de hentou, Hatoyama Shushou 
akasu],” The Asahi Shimbun, November 19, 2009. 
78 Keiichi Kaneko, “Prime Minister Hatoyama explaining he ‘received understanding’ on Delaying 
Futenma Relocation, Secretary Clinton Denying Claims by Notifying Japan’s Ambassador to United 
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the runway and helipad within Camp Schwab or merging with Kadena Air Base.81 
Although the DPJ saw Tokunoshima, Kagoshima Prefecture as the single out of 
Okinawa alternative, they understood the difficult reality creating a FRF out of 
Okinawa. On 23 March 2010 the Cabinet decided to push for creating a runway or 
helipad within Camp Schwab. 82  As expected, both Governor Nakaima and the 
American government rejected the proposal. With two more months until the deadline, 
the Hatoyama administration scrambled to figure whether the feasibility of the 
Tokunoshima alternative. This too failed, as media coverage on DPJ’s tentative 
Tokunoshima proposal resulted in an island-wide demonstration. 
Immense pressure from both the Okinawans and Americans led to Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s demise. Rescinding his promise, Hatoyama eventually 
revoked his plan on May 4, 2010, announcing that Henoko was necessary for 
deterrence.83 The Prime Minister’s failed attempt encouraged Nakaima to run on an 
anti-Futema platform for the 2010 Okinawa gubernatorial elections.84 Hatoyama’s 
failure resulted in a skeptical Washington. While the two following DPJ Prime 
Ministers after Hatoyama tried to revive relations, the first administration’s failure led 
to former LDP Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to advocate strengthening U.S.-Japan 
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relations.85 The relocation problem would once again experience stalemate until the 
LDP’s return to power. 
2.2 Okinawa’s Position that Remained Resilient 
The Hatoyama administration’s endeavor to challenge the initial Level I 
agreement provided political momentum for the Okinawan politicians. On 24 January 
2010, anti-base candidate Susumu Inamine defeated sitting mayor Yoshikazu 
Shimabukuro at the Nago City Mayor Election.86 Changes in Okinawa also affected the 
Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima’s position. Two days after Inamine’s victory, 
Nakaima revealed anti-Henoko sentiment. With these two developments, both the 
Nago City Assembly and Okinawa Prefecture Assembly unanimously agreed on 
opposing relocating Futenma base within the prefecture.87 For Okinawa, the central 
government finally confronted the United States on behalf of Okinawa’s demands. 
2.3 Reconfirming the Level I Agreement 
According to Putnam, the national government on behalf of domestic interest. 
The Okinawa base relocation problem presents a different situation, where two 
governments believe in the superiority of their agreement. Unlike the LDP that agreed 
upon America’s three conditions, the DPJ was the first and only party that strived to 
challenge America’s small win-set. Unfortunately, failure in proposing a suitable 
alternative resulted in a damaged alliance. Failure resulted in reconfirming the 
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necessity of abiding by the Level I agreement, revealing that the alliance’s win-set will 
not be compromised. 
Yukio Hatoyama and the DPJ were not able to change the situation in Okinawa. 
In attempt to alleviate pain, the Hatoyama administration unintentionally and ironically 
worsened relations with both Okinawa and the United States. If the new administration 
knew the depths and developments of the first decade, treatment may have been 
different. No one can deny Hatoyama’s endeavor and heart for Okinawa. He should be 
recognized as the only prime minister who fought for Okinawans against the initial 
Level I agreement. Unfortunately, his sympathy overtook practicality and knowledge, 
which led to his baseless promises without realistic policies in mind prior to 
argumentation. The grand promise of the DPJ thus ended as an expectation, and 
prolonged the stalemate between the constituents. 
3. For the Brighter Future of Okinawa: The Second Abe 
Administration’s Initiatives 
3.1 Unraveling Events under Two Governors 
3.1.1 Nakaima: An Unexpected Approval 
With increasing distrust in the DPJ, in December 2012, the LDP regained power 
to governance.88 Shinzo Abe, who has previously served as Prime Minister in 2006, 
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was chosen to serve once again as Prime Minister of Japan. Unlike the inertia felt 
during his first administration, Abe did not wait to work towards relocation. A month 
after assuming office, Abe worked towards shortening the construction period of the 
second airway of the Naha airport, hoping to use this initiative as a means to negotiate 
relocation. The original construction period, which was planned for seven years, was 
shortened by 14 months.89 
On 2 February 2013, Abe made his first visit to Okinawa since assuming office 
and held a meeting with then Governor Nakaima. Hoping not to alienate Okinawa, Abe 
heavily focused on economic development in Okinawa. Regarding Henoko, he only 
remained mentioning, “Futenma’s koteika [stablization] must not occur” rather than 
proposing alternatives to halt such koteika.90 While accepting the second airway and 
economic aid, Nakaima’s position remained resolute on Futenma’s immediate removal 
and relocation out of the prefecture. This same sentiment was articulated towards the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida on 16 February, with Nakaima claiming, “My 
agenda is to relocate the base out of the prefecture.” 91  Nakama demanded the 
government to review the U.S.-Japan agreement on relocation, the agreement to deploy 
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Ospreys to Okinawa, the criminal offenses caused by and preemption of such actions 
by US soldiers and the US-Japan SACO Agreement. In response, Kishida agreed that 
he would “seriously take these worries into consideration” and “become a Minister that 
can be trusted by the Okinawan electorates.”92 
On 21 February, both Abe and Kishida visited the United States and announced 
the government’s will to submit a landfill request to the local government of 
Okinawa.93  Both Abe and Obama agreed to accelerate the process of relocating 
Futenma and return the facilities south of Kadena. At the press conference held right 
after their bilateral meeting, Abe articulated his will to “revive trust [between the local 
and central government] that was lost during the past three years.”94 With both leaders 
articulating their will to proceed with relocation, the Ministry of Defense submitted a 
landfill request to the Nago Fishery Association on 26 February.95 The following day, 
the head of the Association told the press that they could “99% agree” with the 
landfill. 96  Although the central government is not legally required to receive 
permission from the local fishery association, the government decided that contacting 
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Futenma isetsu],” The Asahi Shimbun, February 27, 2013. 
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the locals would diversify Level II interest. The local fishery association officially 
agreed to landfill on 11 March with the condition of proper compensation.97  
Given the association’s agreement, the central government officially submitted 
the request to conduct a landfill in Henoko bay on 22 March 2013.98 Legally, the 
central government must obtain permission from the local governor to start landfill and 
construction. Amidst of criticism from Okinawan residents, Abe reiterated that 
“Futenma’s koteika must absolutely not occur” and his will to “fully engage in 
reducing the burden on Okinawa.”99 Nakaima responded that he would review the 
government’s request in light of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water 
Surface regardless of his discomfort with the problem. When asked about the request, 
Nakaima responded that it was “unrealistic and impossible” to relocate the base within 
the Prefecture, and expressed his belief that out of Prefecture relocation is the best. 
Nago City Mayor Susumi Inamine criticized the government to forcibly shove Henoko 
onto the Okinawans.100 On 24 March NHK broadcast, Minister of Defense Itsunori 
Onodera spoke that “the actualization of the relocation will allow bases south of 
Kadena to be returned [to Okinawan jurisdiction],” thus hinting that the Futenma 
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relocation is intertwined with other base returns.101 As positions on the base started to 
polarize, on 29 March, the local government of Okinawa officially began review the 
central government’s submission.102 
Talks about base land reversion such as the southern facilities of Kadena started 
to regain momentum during April 2013. On 3 April 2013, Suga visited Okinawa for 
the first time since the LDP’s return to power. As Chief Cabinet Secretary, he 
articulated, “Futenma’s koteika [stablization] must not occur.”103 With Suga repeating 
Abe’s concern by verbatim, the government revealed the relocation plans on 5 April. 
The deadline for Futenma base was changed from Japanese financial year 2022 to 
“Japanese financial year 2022 or later”, making the return dates range from 2013 to 
2028 or later.104 With the changes in the deadlines, Abe claimed that this plan made 
burden reduction on Okinawa palpable. Defense Minister Onodera claimed that the 
first return could occur as soon as August 2013. In response to the changes, Nakaima 
lamented that the new deadlines were vague. He even criticized the government for 
being brash in explanation and “viewing Okinawa lightly.”105 
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Despite fluctuating deadlines, land reversion picked up momentum. On 31 
August 2013, the northern roadway to Camp Kiser, roughly 1 hectares of land, was 
returned.106 On 20 September 2013, the Abe administration requested permission to 
start landfill for the second runway for Naha Airport and decided to start construction 
from January 2014, fastening the procedure by two months.107 The following month, 
on 3 October 2013, the United States and Japan jointly announced that Henoko was the 
only solution and agreed to relocate part of the Marine force to Guam in the beginning 
of 2020s.108 The latter announcement was the first time both governments provided a 
clear date for Marine relocation. Following this announcement, the U.S.-Japan SOFA 
was revised and now allowed victims of US crimes to directly receive the results of 
lawsuits and punishments against the aggressor.109 Up to October 2013, the Japanese 
government received the results of trials from their American counterpart, hindering 
the right of the individual from notifications of proper punishment. This was the first 
time to revise the SOFA regarding the system of announcement. On 9 December 2013, 
the government announced that fifteen KC-130 Aerial refueling aircrafts would be 
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relocated from Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni during the summer of 2014.110 As seen in 
these examples, albeit comparatively minimal to his later achievements, the Abe 
administration made tangible progress and achievements previous administrations 
struggled to accomplish. 
The government endeavored to use rapid progress as means to pressure 
Henoko’s acceptance. Increasing progress did not change Nakaima’s position, as he 
reiterated that he “honestly does not understand [the necessity of relocation].”111 
Amidst Abe’s accomplishments, deployments of twelve Ospreys increased in Okinawa 
and American helicopter HH60 had crashed within Camp Hansen, Uruma, on 6 August 
2013, both concerns for the Okinawan governor. 112  Responding to the central 
government’s position of repeating the phrase “Futenma’s koteika [stablization] must 
not occur”, Nakaima claimed that such repetition “reveals ignorance [of the base 
issue].”113 Despite Nakaima usage of strong language against the central government, 
out of everyone’s surprise, he suddenly changed his position in December 2013. 
Probably two factors affected his position: change of position within the Liberal 
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Democratic Party of Okinawa (LDP Okinawa Kenren) and central government’s grand 
promises. 
Unlike the Liberal Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa 
(LDP Okinawa Kenren) disagreed with the FRF’s location. When Abe visited Okinawa 
back in February 2013, he also visited the Prefectural LDP branch. In addition to the 
Osprey deployment tensions between the local and central government, the Kenren 
told Abe, “[The Prefectural LDP] won Upper House seats based on outer-Prefectural 
relocation and desire to have their electorates’ concerns to be delivered.”114 The 
chairman of the LDP Okinawa Kenren Masatoshi Onaga declared that the local LDP 
would maintain their opposition against relocation within the same prefecture and even 
claimed, “It would be a pity if the government submits a request for landfill while 
ignoring Okinawan sentiment.”115  
The polarization between the Kenren and the Abe administration forced Suga to 
discuss relocation with chairman Masatoshi Onaga on 17 March 2013.116 However, 
Suga failed to convince the Kenren. When meeting the Kenren on 6 April 2013, 
Secretary General of the LDP Shigeru Ishiba admitted the schism between the main 
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LDP platform and local LDP promise and articulated the importance of being united.117 
Although resistant for roughly nine months, after multiple discussions with Ishiba and 
Suga, the sitting five Okinawan LDP Kenren members agreed to accept the Henoko 
relocation in November 2013.118 This change resulted in the LDP Okinawa Kenren’s 
official announcement on 27 November 2013 to accept the Henoko facility as the 
alternative.119 The sudden reversal of position made Onaga to step down as the 
chairman of Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa. 120  This episode reveals that 
Okinawans, regardless of their political affiliation, can take different positions when it 
comes to the base problem.  
The Liberal Democracy Party of Okinawa shift on Futenma surprised Nakaima. 
When asked by press what his thoughts on the sudden change of the Kenren’s stance, 
Nakaima responded back blankly, admitting that he was not aware.121 On 4 December 
2013, Nakaima officially announced to reveal the prefecture’s decision on the central 
government’s request for landfill by the end of the year.122 At the Okinawa Policy 
Council held at the Prime Minister’s Residence on 17 December, Nakaima demanded 
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that operations at Futenma must be closed within three years and operations must halt 
within the next five years.123 He also demanded for the full reversion of Camp Kinser 
within seven years, amendment of the US-Japan SOFA, and relocation the twelve 
deployed Ospreys out of Okinawa. In response, Abe assured Nakaima that he would 
“take the governor’s word with gravity and would try to endeavor [towards realization 
of the requests].”124 Other officials followed up Abe’s promises. On the 20th, Ishiba 
told the LDP of Okinawa that the government was working on practical measures and 
Suga claimed “the Japanese lack knowledge on Okinawan suffering.”125  
On 24 December, Abe provided further economic incentives to Okinawa by 
announcing an annual 300 billion yen in economic aid until fiscal year 2021.126 In 
addition to economic incentives, the Prime Minister announced that he would establish 
a team within the Ministry of Defense to proceed with halting the use of Futenma 
within five years.127 Furthering commitment, on 25 December, Abe promised Nakaima 
that he would negotiate additional amendments to the U.S.-Japan SOFA, relocate half 
of American Ospreys on Okinawa out of the Prefecture and shorten the procedure of 
returning Camp Kinser. With increasing assistance and assurance from the central 
government, Nakaima praised the Prime Mininister stating, “If Futenma can stop 
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operating within five years, the proposal fulfills the promise of ‘removing of danger as 
soon as possible.’ Then there is no problem.”128 As Nakaima’s changed tone suggested, 
on 27 December 2013, the governor accepted the central government’s request to 
conduct a landfill in Henoko bay.129 When asked to defend his decision, Nakima 
responded that he accepted relocation accordingly to the environment law and 
standards. Despite accepting relocation, he claimed that he still believes in outer-
prefecture relocation is the best and most efficient alternative to Futenma. Within a 
year from inauguration, Abe made a significant step in the stagnating relocation 
debatable.   
With Nakaima accepting the relocation, the following year saw a mixture of 
resistance by the Okinawans and action by the central government. During January 
2014, residents of Nago City reelected Susumi Inamine, an opponent against the 
Henoko relocation, as their mayor.130 On April 19, the “Suwarikomi” demonstration 
held at Nago bay reached their tenth anniversary, which started in face of the Ministry 
of Defense’s boring survey of the region.131 More Okinawans resisted when actual 
construction began in the summer. In face of restarting the boring survey, Inamine 
criticized the government for the lack of information sharing despite working on the 
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relocation process.132 The dissatisfaction and frustration engendered by Nakaima and 
Abe’s agreement led to the manifestation of Okinawan discontent in the Okinawa 
gubernatorial elections held in November 2014. 
Abe kept his promises such as implementing a research team within the Ministry 
of Defense for Okinawan burden reduction, relocating fifteen KC-130 Aerial refueling 
aircrafts to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, and attempting to relocate Ospreys from 
Okinawa to Saga Prefecture.133  The Abe administration also announced to close 
Futenma base by February 2019.134 Despite Abe addressing issues raised by Inamine 
back in December 2013, resistance grew as the government started to take concrete 
actions towards constructing the new base. Beginning from July, demolition within 
Camp Schwab, expansion of the restricted area of water, settlement of buoys, boring 
survey and seabed drilling occurred all within 40 days.135 These measures, although 
controversial for the Okinawans, were important steps to revitilize the decade-long 
dormant construction. Unlike the previous Prime Ministers, Abe was able to revive the 
boring survey, which was cancelled since 2004. In addition, the restriction zone was 
expanded to 2 kilometers, given that demonstrators frequently disrupted the previous 
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zone of 50 meters a decade ago.136 Government rhetoric did not shift, with both Suga 
and Abe articulating the necessity of speedily relocating the base in order to minimize 
burden on Okinawa. While things were moving smoothly for the central government, 
the 2014 Okinawa gubernatorial election turned into another hurdle for the relocation 
process. 
Growing dissatisfaction, frustration and disproval against Nakaima and Abe led 
to the rise of Takeshi Onaga, mayor of Naha city, as the symbol of Okinawan 
resistance. While speculation for his bid began around June, he officially announced 
the decision to run for the gubernatorial election in September 2014.137 A staunch 
supporter of Nago City mayor Susumu Inamine, Onaga popularized the terminology 
“All Okinawa,” claiming that everyone in Okinawa is against creating a FRF in 
Henoko bay.  
The government did not consider Onaga as a threat. When asked by Asahi 
Shinbun’s interview on Okinawa gubernatorial elections, one of the LDP executive 
members replied that Onaga is merely trying to garner votes and will not try to halt the 
Henoko construction. 138  In response to the rise of Onaga, on a commercial 
broadcasting program on 12 September, Suga claimed that the relocation problem was 
solved and the revitalization of Okinawa’s economy was the new challenge. Suga also 
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visited Okinawa later that month, articulating that Futenma would be returned to 
Okinawan jurisdiction within five years and thus halting operations by February 
2019.139  
Unfortunately, for the central government, few things were against their favor. 
First, in response to Asahi Shinbun’s interview, one of the authorities within the 
American Ministry of Defense replied that the U.S. government has not agreed with 
the deadline announced by Suga.140 Second, it was no secret that regardless of the 
relocation of fifteen KC-130 Aerial refueling aircrafts to Iwakuni Air Base, practice of 
these aircrafts still were conducted at Futenma.141 In addition, the U.S. military rejected 
the relocation of MV22 Ospreys to Suga Prefecture. 
Given the background of growing dissatisfaction of the Okinawans, central 
government’s emphasis on economic incentives and apparent contradictions with the 
American government, in hindsight it was not surprising that Takeshi Onaga defeated 
Governor Hirokazu Nakaima at the Okinawa gubnatorial elections held on 16 
November 2014.142 As the governor-elect, Onaga announced his will to reexamine the 
relocation issue and the possibility of rescinding Nakaima’s approval if there are any 
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legal problems.143 For the Naha City Mayor elections, held on the same day as the 
governor election, pro-Onaga candidate Mikiko Shiroma won.144  While Okinawa 
democratically presented through the gubernatorial election, four days before stepping 
down from office, on 5 December, Governor Nakaima approved two revision requests 
regarding the construction of Henoko.145 Before leaving office, Nakaima articulated his 
belief that repeating “no” cannot solve the Okinawa base problem and that practical 
measures must be made one by one.146  
Hirokazu Nakaima has been a mixed blessing for all parties. For Okinawans, he 
resisted the central government and made the Abe administration succumb to 
Nakaima’s conditions. For the alliance, Okinawa finally provided legal permission. 
Nakaima’s betrayal towards the residents of Okinawa Prefecture also led to the rise of 
Takeshi Onaga. Perhaps the most interesting thing about Nakaima is his supposedly 
contradictory stance on Henoko. While accepting relocation, he has repeatedly claimed 
that he still believed that out-of-Prefecture relocation was the best solution. As seen in 
the following section, Nakaima knew something about the Okinawans that both the 
U.S. and Japanese government failed to understand: Okinawans are faithful to their 
win-sets and would against relocation through any available means. 
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3.1.2 Onaga: “All-Okinawa” Against Relocation 
Takeshi Onaga’s transition to Okinawa governor wasn’t positively accepted by 
the central government. When visiting Nagatocho, Tokyo for the first time as the 
governor of Okinawa, he failed to meet Abe and Suga.147 After few attempts, he met 
Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Minister Yamaguchi. 
As for civilian demonstrations held on Okinawa, the guards of Camp Schwab arrested 
a demonstrator for the first time, raising further commotion among the 
demonstrators.148 Regarding the relocation, on 12 March, the government restarted the 
boring survey in Henoko bay, which was halted for six months due to the weather and 
the speculated affects to the 2014 Lower House Elections.149 In face of these events, 
Onaga only made comments and threats rather than taking direct action. On the same 
day the government restarted their boring survey, Onaga claimed that he would “use all 
the means possible to halt construction of Henoko base as promised during 
elections.”150 Regarding the demonstration incident, Onaga commented, “Such action 
was form of extreme police brutality never seen before.”151 Perhaps the greatest move 
he took after assuming office was the establishment of the Third Party Investigation 
Team on whether former governor Inamine’s approval was consistent with legal 
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requirements of not.152 Fortunately for Onaga, he saw an opportunity in halting the 
procedure of construction. 
On 23 March 2015, Onaga demanded that the Ministry of Defense must end all 
activities by 30 March. Both local and central government knew that the legal 
permission to conduct investigation would expire by the end of the month. If the 
government failed to halt investigation, Onaga claimed that he would rescind the 
government’s legal permission to destruct the reef, which Suga replied that such action 
would probably take the local government to court.153 In response to Onaga’s threat, 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) claimed that Onaga’s 
demand would hurt both residents around Futenma base and the U.S.-Japan relations in 
terms of security and trust, thus ignoring Onaga’s demand.154 With MAFF’s decision, 
Minister of Defense Nakatani announced the government’s decision to extend the 
boring survey until the end of June.155  As friction became apparent, the central 
government announced interest in holding meetings with Governor Onaga. For the first 
time since inauguration, in April, Onaga was able to met Minister Yamaguchi, Chief 
Cabinet Secretary of Japan Suga, Minister of Defense Nakatani, and Abe within two 
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weeks.156 Meetings between the two parties sporadically continued throughout May 
and June as well. However, as speculated by analysts, friction remained. In the midst 
of these meetings, Camp Foster’s West Compartment was returned on 4 April.157 
While Suga praised this return as a reminder to physically lessen the burden on 
Okinawa, Onaga critically responded that the Americans usurped the land from the 
Okinawans. With the rise of an adamant governor, the situation stalled once again. 
If the first six months of Onaga’s term was passive or only limited to harangue, 
the following six months revealed his commitment in fighting against both the United 
States of America and Japan. In hopes to lobby Okinawan sentiment towards U.S. 
media and financially support lobbying visits to Washington D.C., regular civilians 
established the Henoko Fund on 10 April 2015.158 Whether in response to this civilian 
action or not, from 27 May to 4 June, Onaga visited both Hawaii and Washington D.C. 
to express Okinawan discontent and lobby against relocation.159 Onaga’s strong yet 
fruitless opposition against the boring survey extension back in March escalated in July. 
While Onaga was unable to stop the government from continuing their investigation, 
                                                
156 “Stand-off between Governor Onaga and Suga: the Henoko Relocation ‘Impossible’ 
[Henokoisetsu ‘zettai dekinai’ Onaga chiji, Sugashi to heikousen],” The Asahi Shimbun, April 6, 2015; 
“Stand-off between Governor Onaga and the Prime Minister [Shushou to Onaga chiji heikousen],” The 
Asahi Shimbun, April 18, 2015. 
157 Kazuo Yamagishi and Norihisa Hoshino, “Perceived distance due to Henoko [Henoko meguri 
kyorikan],” The Asahi Shimbun, April 5, 2015. 
158 Kazuo Yamagishi, “Henoko Fund Established [Henoko isetsu hantai kikin wo tachiage],” The 
Asahi Shimbun, April 10, 2015. 




due to typhoons, at the end of their self-announced extension, the government 
announced its will to further extend the survey until the end of September.160  
This was immediately challenged by the Third Party Investigation Team’s final 
report. In July, the Investigation Team announced that the former governor’s approval 
was illegal in light of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface due to 
insufficient environmental assessment.161 After receiving the report, Onaga announced 
that he would review the findings and announce Okinawa Prefecture’s decision in late 
August. Perhaps in response to this reveal, the central government decided to halt all 
construction procedure and have an intensive month of discussion with Onaga.162 
However, similar to the April discussions, both parties never came to an agreement and 
focused on different themes of the issue. Both decided that there was no need to extend 
the period of dialogue.163   
With talks failing, the government immediately resumed activities from 12 
September 2015.164 As anticipated back in July, on 14 September, the Prefecture 
notified the Okinawa Defense Bureau that they started the procedure of rescinding 
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permission of landfill.165 Onaga followed up the notification by officially revoking 
permission from the government on 13 October.166 With the new development in the 
base problem, both central and local government anticipated the possibility of going 
into court. The following day, the LDP submitted both an appeal and suspension of the 
governor’s official revocation to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism (MLIT) Keiichi Ishii.167 While preparation for an appeal required both parties 
to explain and defend their position, on 26 October, Minister Ishii announced that 
Onaga’s revocation would be suspended under the Administration Appeal Act.168 
Despite the fact that the MLIT was still processing and addressing a possible appeal, 
the Abe administration decided to restart construction from 29 October.169 Amidst the 
government’s forcible gesture in October, financial scandals of previous governor 
Nakaima’s environmental assessment team and the central government’s direct 
financial assistance to the three adjacent districts to Henoko Bay received criticism and 
further angered the Okinawans.170 
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The resumption of construction was followed by an official lawsuit by MLIT 
Minister Ishii on 17 November 2015 for rescinding permission for construction.171 The 
MLIT submitted the lawsuit on the basis that Okinawa’s decision undermined both 
national security and foreign relations. 172  Other reasons included the fruitless 
concentrated period of discussion during August and legitimacy of the proposal’s 
environmental assessment. Reflecting the reasons behind the lawsuit, Suga commented 
that Okinawa’s decision is tantamount to ignoring U.S.-Japan endeavors to decrease 
burden on Okinawa.173 When asked about the speculated results, one of the LDP 
executive members commented he was “100% sure that [the government] will not 
lose.”174 In response to the lawsuit, Governor Onaga responded that this was “a direct 
manifestation of discrimination towards Okinawa.”175  
As the first lawsuit led to court hearings in early December, the Okinawa 
Prefecture submitted a lawsuit in the regional court against the government on 25 
December.176 The second lawsuit questioned whether MLIT’s position and analysis of 
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Okinawa was unbiased, and argued that Minister Ishii, part of Abe’s cabinet, submitted 
the lawsuit in alignment in personal interest. When the Prefecture appealed to the 
Committee for Settling National-Local Disputes on 24 December, the Committee 
refused to review their case, claiming that they are not entitled to review a case that the 
Administration Appeal Act has acted upon.177 Dissatisfied with the refusal, on 1 
February 2016, the prefecture submitted a third lawsuit against the central government, 
questioning the legality of the Administration Appeal Act used by the MLIT Minister 
Ishii.178 The Okinawa Base Problem quickly evolved into a peculiar situation where 
three legal cases stood between the local and central government. 
With the escalation of legal conflict, the court proposed a reconciliation plan 
between the two parties on 4 February 2016.179 Despite the government’s strong stance 
at the beginning of November 2015, the Prime Minister announced on 4 March 2016 
that both sides would withdraw their lawsuits.180 While he made it clear that the 
government’s position on Henoko has not changed, Abe announced that in order to 
appropriately proceed with reconciliation, the government would halt construction.  
With all lawsuits withdrawn, it was speculated that the country would submit a 
revision to the prefecture regarding the base creation. Okinawa would not respond to 
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the revision and would submit a complaint to the Committee for Settling National-
Local Disputes. Whether the Committee rules in favor of the central government or 
prefecture, the losing party would most likely take the issue to court. Both parties have 
made it clear that they would abide by ruling. Without much time from withdrawal, as 
speculated, on 7 March, MLIT Minister Ishii resubmitted a document recanting the 
Okinawan governor’s rescinding as illegal.181 With the new development of events, on 
23 March, governor Takeshi Onaga and lieutenant governor Mitsuo Ageta met with 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani for the 
first discussion on Futenma post-reconciliation. 182  Regardless of previous 
conversations that were deemed unfruitful, both parties decided to continue dialogue in 
the midst of pessimism. 
At this moment of time, what mattered more than conversation were legal 
decisions. This was reflected with the speedy request submitted on 7 March 2016 
towards Okinawa to reevaluate their “illegal” revocation. Because Okinawa denied 
wrongdoing, the Committee for Settling National-Local Disputes held nine hearings 
for the next two months. 183 Despite the multiple hearings, on 17 June, the Committee 
decided that they were not in the position declare whether Onaga’s demand to revoke 
permission was illegal or not. In defense of their decision, the Committee argued, 
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“Whatever decision we make, it would not contribute to the constructing better 
relations between the prefecture of the central government. Passing a ruling is not the 
best option.” 184  This was equally surprising for both Okinawa and the central 
government. In response to the decision, a government-affiliated official revealed the 
common belief that the Committee would make a clear ruling whether it was illegal or 
not.185 In response to the decision, on 18 June, Takeshi Onaga announced that in 
respect to the indecision by the Committee, the prefecture would not take the issue to 
court and would instead invest time for dialogue.186 
The government did not view the situation in the same manner. On 22 July 2016, 
the Abe administration submitted a similar lawsuit against the prefecture as their 
original one submitted back during November 2015.187 With hearings held during 
August, on 16 September, the local court ruled against Okinawa. Arguing that the court 
was biased in favor of the central government, Onaga appealed to the Supreme Court 
on 23 September.188 The legal battle came to an end with the Supreme Court ruling in 
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favor of the government on 20 December. 189  Clothed with legal authority, the 
government resumed construction on 27 December. Following events unfolded in 
favor of the government. Hoping to show their continued commitment to burden 
reduction, 4000 hectares of the Northern Training Area was returned to the Prefecture 
on 22 December.190 By March 2017, the government finished placing half of all 
concrete blocks necessary on the seabed of Henoko bay. 191  In response, Onaga 
threatened another lawsuit against the central government if the state continues 
construction post-March, which is the period after the government’s permission for 
reef destruction would expire.192 These threats have not halted the government’s 
initiatives. With the completion of the concrete block placements, the landfill of 
Henoko bay started on 25 April with plans to be finished by 2021. 193  Despite 
Okinawa’s long history of resistance, the long-standing stalemate finally took a major 
step towards the replacement facility. 
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3.2 Unwavering Commitment to the Level I Agreement 
3.2.1 American Position: From Best to “Only Solution” 
For the United States, the FRF itself is a result of long negotiations, thus 
strengthening the country’s commitment towards relocation and belief of Henoko Bay 
as the “only solution.” America appreciates the negotiations as a “result of meaningful, 
sustained work between the United States and Japan.”194 The Department of State 
(DOS) reiterated such significance. Even when statistics reveal Okinawan discontent, 
the DOS continued to reiterate that the “construction of the facility is the meaningful 
result of years of sustained work between the United States and Japan.”195 This was 
further testified when Mark C. Toner, Deputy Spokesperson of the DOS, emphasized 
that the plans for the FRF are results of constructive negotiations, as bureaucrats at the 
DOS had “talked about [the American position] for many times – or over many years, 
rather, from this podium.”196 Even when American related crimes or accidents escalate 
local demonstrations, America remained committed, as the DOS Spokesperson John 
Kirby commented, “[N]othing’s changed about our importance of moving forward on a 
replacement facility; nothing’s changed about our commitment in working with the 
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government in Tokyo.... So nothing’s changed in our regard in terms of the importance 
of the replacement facility.” 197  The list continues, with American bureaucrats 
remaining resilient towards commitment on relocation.198 For the United States, the 
current FRF resulted as a joint work between the two governments and thus values the 
decision. The American government’s decision not to modify their win-sets is 
buttressed by the fruits of negotiation. 
Once the Henoko plan was accepted by Nakaima and challenged by Governor 
Onaga, the DOS furthered commitment by claiming that Henoko was the “only 
solution.” During Onaga’s visit to the United States in 2015, the governor met State 
Department Office of Japanese Affairs Director Joe Young and Acting Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Cara Abercrombie. According to the DOS 
announcement of the meeting, both officials claimed, “The FRF is the only solution 
that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the 
continued use of Maine Corps Air Station Futenma.”199 The Department of State had 
repeated the same belief verbatim throughout Obama administration, and this continues 
under the current Trump administration as well.200  
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As seen from official comments made by the Department of State, the United 
States values the current FRF plan as the “only solution” for relocating MCAS 
Futenma. The negotiations of the blueprint, which took the span of a decade, reveals 
commitment of both governments in realignment the presence of American forces on 
Okinawa. Regardless of challenges posed by accidents, demonstrators and the local 
government, the length of the negotiations cemented American commitment to 
relocating accordingly to the FRF. America has been resilient on the issue of relocation 
and continues to abide by their win-sets as determined in 1996.  
3.2.2 Japanese Position: Avoiding Koteika and Reducing Burden 
The second Abe administration reengaged the stagnant process of relocation. 
Abe and his cabinet members had repeatedly argued, “Futenma’s koteika must not 
occur.” As hinted by language used by the American government, unless a relocation 
facility is prepared, Futenma cannot be closed. Once assuming office, the Abe cabinet 
emphasized their desire to fully commit to burden reduction. When submitting landfill 
request to the Okinawan government on 22 March 2013, Abe announced, “Futenma’s 
koteika must absolutely not occur. [We will] fully devote in burden reduction.”201 
Former Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera also explained how the request of 
landfill is a step towards burden reduction. This same argument still continues to this 
day. 
                                                                                                                             
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/09/247117.htm; U.S. Department of State, “Meeting With Okinawa 
Governor Onaga,” U.S. Department of State, last modified on February 3, 2017, accessed on April 28, 
2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/02/267448.htm.  
201 Abe Shinzo quoted in ““Okinawa to Oppose.” 
 
60 
3.3 Careful Implementation Amidst Level II Resistance 
The Japanese government has been more active, hoping to appease both 
American and Okinawans. Ranging from negotiations of the original blueprint to the 
current administration, the Japanese government expressed gestures of consideration 
towards Okinawans. Through multiple incentives, the second Abe administration 
endeavored to change Okinawa’s win-set. 
Abe’s greetings at the Battle of Okinawa Ceremonies since his leadership from 
2012 portray the current position of the Japanese government. For both 2013 and 2014, 
Abe reiterated his position that he “will make every effort to lighten to the greatest 
possible extent the burden of the bases.”202 However, in 2014, Abe provided greater 
emphasis on the role of Okinawa in relation to Japan’s future than in 2013. In Abe’s 
2015 speech, he mentioned for the first time how “the needs of national security have 
placed a heavy burden on the people of Okinawa, with the concentration of U.S. 
military bases being a case in point.”203 He further tried to connect with the Okinawans 
by pointing out to the murder of an Okinawan by a former American military man in 
his 2016 speech and even promised that the “Japanese government, which bears the 
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responsibility of protecting the lives and property of the Japanese citizens, will 
promptly set out measures so that such tragic crimes are never repeated.”204 
With gradual change in his tone, Abe reemphasized his desire to lighten the 
burdens of the Okinawans and to develop Okinawa’s local economy. Abe mentioned 
that Okinawa experiences “heavy impact of U.S. military bases” in both 2015 and 
2016, but he has not admitted the voice of struggles in Okinawa. Most of his speech is 
focused on what the government can provide for Okinawa. He also focused a lot on the 
future of Okinawa, hinging on the economic future of the government. Regardless of 
Abe’s efforts, Okinawans believe their voice has been marginalized. Because of 
Okinawa’s stagnant low win-set, the Japanese government strived to conduct 
relocation without overtly suppressing Okinawan voice. 
This is clear when observing history. The LDP continued with the relocation 
only under former Okinawa governor Inamine and Nakaima. Although the government 
conducted construction and inspection over the years and has received criticism by the 
islanders, they have been more or less careful to be seen as considerate. Abe 
continuously endeavored to garner support by offering development aid and projects, 
such as the construction of the Naha second runway.205 The reason why Abe decided to 
agree with rescinding all three lawsuits in March 2016 is to show a gesture of concern. 
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The Japanese government held meetings with Takeshi Onaga in hopes to come to a 
consensus. Regardless of these gestures, Abe failed to receive support, as seen in the 
polls and the 2016 Upper House Elections results in Okinawa Prefecture.206 Despite the 
fact that the LDP has immense power in both houses, the LDP has not forced the issue 
on Okinawa. Currently, the Abe administration is landfilling Henoko bay amidst 
continuing opposition. While this may seem like the government is overtly suppressing 
opposition voices, the government proceeded with construction only after legal 
authority from the Supreme Court. By defeating the local government in court, the 
government continues to appeal to the Japanese public that they are a responsible and 
considerate entity. 
3.4 Analysis: Reconfirming the Level II Agreement 
Since Hatoyama’s voluntary defection and failure of changing the initial win-set, 
America and Japan continued to reconfirm their commitment in executing the Level I 
agreement. The second Abe administration endeavored in gaining Okinawan support 
by providing economic incentives and slowly fulfilling the reversion of facilities other 
than Futenma base as mentioned in the 1996 SACO Final Report. Implementations of 
the Final Report such as agreed land returns and relocation of the KC-130 Aerial 
refueling aircrafts pressured then Governor Nakima. Lost of support from the LDP 
Okinawa Kenren and Abe’s continued gestures towards grand promises pushed 
Nakaima to accept relocation.  
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Contrary to the governor’s belief that the bargain from the government was 
sufficient, Okinawa Prefecture reconfirmed their Level II commitment through the 
democratic procedure of gubernatorial elections. With Onaga as the new symbol of 
Okinawa, the central government became careful with implementation. The Supreme 
Court ruling in favor of the central government strengthens the alliance to ignore 
Okinawa’s low win-set for relocation. The Level II institution of democracy, which 
hindered construction post-Nakima’s approval, is currently allowing the government to 
continue construction regardless of opposition. The continuation of relocation may 
result in a new facility in Henoko, but will not result in expanding Okinawa’s win-set. 
Onaga’s victory proved that Okinawa remains steadfast to their commitment of out-of-




IV. Comparative Analysis of the Three Periods 
1. Changes of Okinawa’s Position? Questioning Okinawa’s Win-set 
Perhaps both American and Japanese government are genuinely confused with 
what the Okinawans want. While some may argue that the construction itself is illegal 
due to improper environmental evaluation, others have argued that an “unfair” relation 
between the United States of America and Japan result as Japanese suffering. 
Grassroots organizations such as the Okinawa Peace Movement Center (Okinawa 
Heiwa Undo Center), Anti-Helicopter Base Council (Heri Kichi Hantai Kyougikai) 
and SEALDs RYUKYU have emphasized on the necessity of peace.207 On 1 April 
2015, a total of 22 individuals, including authors, lawyers and academics, created a 
petition on Change.org arguing that the current relocation plan is a violation of 
democracy and destruction of Okinawa’s nature.208 The plethora of arguments by 
Okinawan apologists may confuse observers in what Okinawa argues around and 
desires for. 
When discussing the Okinawan will, the phrase “All Okinawa” commonly 
appears on media. A term originally used against the deployment of MV-22 Ospreys, 
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“All Okinawa” is a phenomenon where Okinawans, regardless or their political 
background, unite against the increasing presence of military bases. This phrase was 
popularized by Takeshi Onaga’s platform and victory. Onaga had repeatedly argued 
for “ideology over identity” and claimed that this triumph resulted in his election.209 
This naturally raises the question whether an “All Okinawa” phenomenon really exists 
and what is Okinawa’s greatest concern. 
 Out of all the arguments that exist in media and literature, this section focuses on 
the two main arguments against the FRF plan: protection of environment and 
marginalization by government. The section will then compare the civilian level 
interest with the overarching themes through utilizing opinion polls conducted by the 
central government, NHK, and the prefectural government. Local elections of Ginowan 
City, Nago City, and Okinawa Prefecture will also be investigated, as democratic 
elections are a means to analyze Okinawan interest. 
1.1. The Environmental Argument: The Beautiful Sea and Dugongs 
It is fairly common to read about local individuals’ concerns about the beautiful 
ocean of Henoko. On an island that exemplifies the beauties of nature, both land and 
sea, the image of environmental protection seems strong. At his governor inauguration, 
Takeshi Onaga argued, “[The government] should halt landfill Henoko base in the 
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beautiful sea.”210  He also argued that the current FRF is “the destruction of an 
internationally valued natural environment” and tantamount to creating a base on 
“Matsuhima Bay or Lake Biwa, Lake Towada” in the name of security.211 The Anti-
Helicopter Base Council is the most vocal Okinawan organization that cooperates with 
other non-Okinawan organizations to protect the sea for environmental reasons.212 As 
written on their website, the organization explains how Henoko bay is home to a 
variety of coral and seaweed, including the dugong, a symbolic marine mammal 
usually used in protests against base creation. According to the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF), dugongs are considered “vulnerable” due to the loss of habitat and water 
pollution.213 With the acceleration of habitation loss and evidence of dugong visits to 
Henoko bay, environmentalists argue for environmental protection. 
Non-Okinawan organizations are more vocal on the importance on protecting 
the sea of Henoko. World Wildlife Fund Japan published an open letter addressed to 
former Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima while he had a team of experts 
conducting environmental assessments. According to WWF Japan, Henoko, or Oura 
Bay, is one of the 200 regions that still preserve exceptional biodiversity.214 Thirty-six 
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new species of crustaceans were discovered in 2009, leading to biologists wanting to 
further investigate the region.215 In addition to the Dugong, the Oura Bay is home to 
one of the largest blue corals (Heliopora coerulea) with the height of 12 meters, width 
of 30 meters, and length of 60 meters. While the base will not be directly created on 
top of this reef, the landfill containing soil from other regions could greatly affect the 
environment and result in the damage of the reef. The Nature Conservation Society of 
Japan, a NGO based in Tokyo, upholds the same argument. In a letter addressed to 
current governor Onaga, while referring to other sources such as the Japanese Coral 
Reef Society and The Ecological Society of Japan, the Conversation Society argued 
that the concrete blocks have already affected the ocean.216 The NGO revealed that 
governmental sources such as the “U.S. Marine Corps Recommended Findings 2014” 
and sources from the Okinawa Defense Bureau have admitted the evidence of dugongs 
feeding on sea grass found within the area of construction. While Okinawan 
environmental NGOs such as the Okinawa Environment Network (Okinawa Kankyo 
Network) exist, they are less involved in issues relating to Henoko.217  This fact 
discredits the efforts and calls to protect the beautiful sea of Henoko and suggests that 
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protests against the FRF may not be heavily revolved around arguments for 
environmental protection. 
The relatively weak effort by locals does not translate into the weak response by 
Okinawan politicians. On 27 June 2015, the Ministry of Defense announced that they 
plan to use soil from the Shikoku region.218 As WWF warned, this soil contains 
Argentine Ants, which can affect the Okinawan environment if used. In response to 
this danger, on 13 July, the Okinawa Prefecture Assembly voted to create principles 
and rules when using soil and sand.219 The prefecture also conducted surveys on coral 
reefs in the region.220 This is most likely a response to few corals damaged due to 
concrete blocks implementation.221 Whether these decisions were politically driven or 
not, Okinawa has responded to environmental concerns raised by environmental 
NGOs. 
Another development that is worrisome yet received little attention by 
environmental defenders is the financial scandal of former Okinawa Governor 
Nakaima’s environmental panel. Three out of the thirteen environmental panelists 
received a total of 11 million yen (roughly 100 thousand USD) from companies with 
contracts to build the FRF.222 All of the meetings were closed to public, and the 
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summary of discussions was published nine months after the last meeting.223 It was 
later revealed that companies that provided donations include IDEA Consultants, 
Penta-Corporations, Environmental Consultants for Ocean and Human (ECOH), and 
Toyo Construction. In response to scandal that Asahi Shimbun researched and revealed, 
Yoshihide Suga responded, “The committee debated environmental issues on middle-
ground. There is no problem.”224  Takeshi Onaga commented that it was deeply 
regrettable that the assessment committee was receiving donations claiming, 
“Prefectural residents have a hard time consenting [the transactions].”225 Although 
Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani also claimed that the donations have not affected the 
discussions of the panelists, on 28 October, the Ministry of Defense announced to 
remove the four companies involved in donations.226 This scandal provided legitimacy 
to the Third Party Investigation Team’s assessment that insufficient environmental 
assessment was conducted under the previous governor and to the legal argument 
against the FRF. 
As the evidence above suggests, there are biological reasons for Okinawans to 
oppose the creation of the new base. The financial scandal of the assessment 
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committee should provide momentum to environmentalists. Regardless of these 
revelations, lack of enthusiasm for Okinawan environmentalists is observed. An 
unstated understanding of environmental damage can be perceived, but opponents have 
not used the environment argument to their advantage. This reveals that despite disgust 
against tarnishing the beautiful sea of Henoko, environmental issues may not a top 
priority of the demonstrators. 
1.2 The Marginalization Argument: The “Spiritual Starvation” of 
Okinawa 
The marginalization argument receives the most enthusiasm. Picked up media, 
academics and politicians, the argument revolves around the rejection of the Okinawan 
will, which is reflected in both historical and current events. Editorials with titles such 
as “[Okinawa] should not be treated as a sacrifice” and “Prioritizing America over 
Okinawa” reveals feelings of rejection by greater authorities.227 The 1997 Akitagawa 
Prize Winner Shun Medoruma lamented that his anger transformed into hatred because 
nothing has changed regardless of Okinawans’ expressing their will through 
democratic elections over. 228  As seen in the title of Medoruma’s interview, 
sympathizers use the Ryuku language to create a distinct distinction between the 
Uchinanchu (Okinawan) and Yamatu (Okinawan pronunciation of the Yamato ethnic 
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race, the Japanese). This sense of alienation is probably best captured by Tetsuya 
Takahashi, philosophy professor at The University of Tokyo. 
Takahashi described this treatment of Okinawa as a result of a system of 
sacrifice. This system sacrifices the minorities in a society in order to maintain the 
benefits of the majority, and such treatment is usually hidden or is justified.229 While 
his first book was mainly theoretical, he followed up this concept by further 
explanation its application to Okinawa: the security of the majority is maintained by 
sacrificing Okinawa.230 Takahashi argued that while most Japanese value the U.S.-
Japan Security Alliance, most of American forces are located in Okinawa, thus 
creating an unbalance in burden sharing. Rather than merely criticizing the government, 
Takahashi argued that the Japanese civilian is responsible for perpetuating the sacrifice 
of Okinawa by seeking an alliance with the United States while not partaking in burden 
sharing.231 The philosopher followed this line of argument by criticizing the militaristic 
explanation that Okinawa is geographically strategic; if placing forces on Okinawa is 
important for emerging threats, this mentality bolsters the justification of a precious or 
inevitable sacrifice. The philosopher has flaws, as he mainly focused on human rights 
rather than taking geopolitical implications and the nature of the Marines into serious 
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consideration. However, Takahashi’s argument provides the theoretical framework of 
the marginalization argument: Okinawan concerns are rejected for a national cause. 
Proponents of the marginalization argument also refer back to history to explain 
how the history of Okinawan marginalization is being repeated. Events such as 
Imperial Japan’s forcible annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, horrors of the Battle of 
Okinawa, and the rape and murder of five-year-old Yumiko-chan are shared by 
Okinawans as common knowledge of their unfortunate history.232 The forcible FRF, in 
the eyes of anti-base Okinawans, is only part of Okinawa’s long history of rejection. 
Okinawa Governor Takeshi Onaga also argues along the same line of sentiment. 
At the first hearing of the first legal court, Onaga argued that Okinawans suffer from 
“spiritual starvation” (tamashii no kigakan), which has resulted from the “usurpation of 
freedom, equality, rights and autonomy.”233 Similar language was used at his speeches 
at the Battle of Okinawa Memorial Day Ceremony in 2015 and 2016. Onaga declared 
that the 2014 Okinawa gubernatorial election reflected Okinawan’s will. In the 2015 
speech, Onaga articulated, “The cornerstone of peace cannot be established without 
respecting and protecting civilian’s freedom, equality, human rights and democratic 
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rights.”234 In the following year, Onaga claimed, “In order to establish the cornerstone 
of peace in a true manner, the basics of the U.S.-Japan [SOFA] should be reexamined, 
the presence of the Marines and bases should decrease, and base reduction should 
immediately occur.”235 In both speeches, it can be observed that the governor of 
Okinawa believes that the concerns of the country has triumphed and neglected the will 
of Okinawans. 
Onaga’s perspective of the Abe administration is further articulated in his 11 
November 2015 press conference regarding the revocation of Henoko construction. 
When a reporter asked for Onaga’s response towards Abe’s comments that the 
revocation was illegal and would dismiss public interest, the Okinawan governor 
responded that the Prime Minister is not taking into consideration of the Okinawan’s 
will.236 When Onaga spoke at court in defense of the lawsuits occurring between the 
local and central government, he claimed that immense presence of the American 
military bases is the reason Okinawa’s unfortunate history is receiving greater 
attention.237 For Onaga, the origins of the FRF problem is not, as Yoshihide Suga has 
mentioned, the relocation of one of the most dangerously located bases, but in the 
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forcible usurpation of land from the Okinawans post-WWII. 238  The Okinawan 
governor also questioned the establishment of Restoration of Sovereignty Day, a 
national holiday institutionalized from 28 April 2013. While this holiday was supposed 
to celebrate Japan’s return as a sovereign country in 1952 with the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, Onaga argued that Okinawa did not return to Japan until 1972.239 In Okinawa, 
this holiday is treated as the day of embarrassment, as Okinawa was officially placed 
under American jurisdiction.240 Actions only suggest discrimination. 
In his book, Onaga further illustrates the marginalization experienced by the 
Okinawans. Onaga criticized the Abe administration for contradictions in promises and 
actions. The governor argued, “The forcible concentration of bases ignores the 
democratic will of Okinawans.”241 When discussing alternatives to the FRF, Onaga 
criticized the Japanese government’s default answer of “Henoko is the only solution to 
Futenma” ignores the fact that Futenma base was originally forced on Okinawans 
without their consent.242  Furthermore, the verbatim argument of “abandoning the 
Henoko relocation plan will translate into the koteika of Futenma” can be interpreted as 
a threat by the central government.243 The usual usage of carrot and sticks policy 
towards Okinawa frustrates the governor as well. This was seen with Abe’s promise to 
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increase financial aid towards Okinawa at the end of 2014 and the LDP rescinding 
their 50 billion yen in assistance to Nago City after Onaga’s victory.244 Finally, in his 
concluding chapter, Onaga decried that politicians, bureaucrats and regular Japanese 
citizens argue that the amount of aid Okinawa Prefecture receives is significantly 
larger than other prefectures and hence suggest that Okinawa should be stop 
complaining: “[After hearing the argument that Okinawa receives aid and should stop 
complaining] I respond, ‘How is Okinawa being spoiled by Japan. Or is Japan being 
spoiled by Okinawa.’”245 The governor argued that economic aid should not be seen as 
a compensation for base burden. Such mentality represents subtle discrimination 
against Okinawa, which results in marginalization. 
This line of argument receives the most attention by media, academics and 
politicians. The historical treatment of Okinawa continues to gain more attention as the 
tensions between the island and two governments persist. For some, the current 
problem is repeated history of the previous grievances of Okinawa. Takahashi 
addressed this issue by proposing the system of sacrifice theory, which results in 
marginalizing one party for the benefit of the majority. This theory is supported by 
how Onaga perceives the gestures by the Abe administration amidst the relocation 
debate. Those who have taken the marginalization argument to an extreme argue for 
independence, which Onaga has denied as the majority voice.246 However, as long as 
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the central government continues the construction of the current FRF amidst of 
Okinawan discontent revealed through the democratic procedure, the island’s “spiritual 
starvation” may continue to persist. 
Multitudes of arguments against the proposed FRF exist in Okinawan dialogue. 
Out of all arguments, the environmental and marginalization explanations receive the 
most attention. As concerned, the proposed FRF will affect the surrounding 
environment. However, the lack of Okinawan NGOs leading the environmental debate 
questions whether environmental concerns are of top priority. The marginalization 
argument received the most concern by locals, media, academics and politicians. This 
argument ranges from historical to continued treatment, which results in the rejection 
and curtailment of Okinawan opposition. Onaga Takeshi picked up on these two 
arguments throughout his career as governor. As the democratically elected governor, 
he believes his victory against Nakaima revealed the Okinawan will. To further 
understand what the Okinawan will is, it is important to compare previous elections 
and statistical data on Okinawan concerns with the three main arguments. 
1.3 Statistical Data on Okinawan Concern 
When observing at public opinion polls in Okinawa, statistics provided by the 
Okinawan Times or Ryukyu Times reveal a strong anti-base sentiment. In order to be 
as objective as possible, opinion polls conducted by the central government, NHK and 
the prefectural government will be taken into consideration. Interestingly, the Cabinet 
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office only conducted three public opinion polls on Okinawan sentiment in 1989, 1994 
and 2001. According to the Cabinet Offices’ numbers, in 2001, 9.8 percent of 
Okinawans believed in the necessity of American military bases, while 35.9 percent 
believed that the bases are an unavoidable necessity for security.247 When comparing 
these numbers with the 1994 survey, both numbers have increased. Simultaneously, 
opinion that American military bases were not necessary decreased from 24.9 percent 
in 1994 to 20.6 percent in 2001. The 2012 NHK public opinion polls reveal the 
continued increasing trend in both Okinawan perception on the necessity of bases (11 
percent) and unavoidable necessity (45 percent).248  Regardless of the increase in 
individuals that believe in the necessity of American bases, the percentage of 
individuals who believe that American bases are unnecessary remains around 20 
percent. Therefore, the myth that Okinawans are against American bases can be 
debunked to a certain degree. If anything, most Okinawans believe there are no 
alternatives to the necessity of these American bases.  
However, a general recognition of the bases’ role in security does not translate in 
accepting the heavy base presence on Okinawa. Unlike the government polls, NHK 
questioned about the base presence on Okinawa. Regardless of the increases in 
numbers of Okinawans who believe in the importance of the bases, the desire to 
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decreases base presence just like mainland Japan increased by 8 percent from 1992, 
which resulted in 55 percent in favor.249 The desire to get rid of all bases decreased by 
13 percent when compared to 1992, resulting in 21 percent of Okinawans approving 
removing all bases. Those who argued that the status quo could remain amounts to 19 
percent, which is a 8 percent increase from the previous report. Although the number 
of Okinawans desiring all bases to leave remains relatively significant, these supporters 
have decreased. It is important to note that the majority of Okinawans desire the 
concentration of bases to ease even before the Futenma helicopter crash in 2004 and 
the Hatoyama-shock. 
Things get interesting when observing the responses towards the question of 
whether base concentration on Okinawa is unusual. According to the poll, 57 percent 
of Okinawans believe that base concentration is unusual, while 29 percent agree that it 
is unusual if they had to decide.250 While 4 percent of Okinawans believe that base 
concentration on Okinawa is not unusual, only 8 percent of the Japanese population 
agreed in the absolute necessity. Interestingly, while numbers reveal a common 
agreement on the necessity of American bases, this agreement failed to translate into 
the justification of heavy base concentration.  
The 2012 NHK poll also compared Okinawan and the Japanese view on the 
Futenma Relocation Facility with Henoko, Nago City as an alternative. The report 
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reveals that 72 percent of Okinawan respondents (oppose if they had to decide 32% 
and oppose 40%) disprove the current relocation plan, while 20 percent (support 6% 
and support if they had to decide 14%) support the current plan.251 When compared 
with the entire Japanese population, those who are unfavorable of the current plan 
amount to 45 percent, while 36 percent believe that Henoko is the solution. As 
alternatives to the current plan, 18 percent agreed that the bases should be relocated 
within the country but out of the prefecture, 30 percent agree that the bases should go 
abroad, and another 18 percent believed that Funtema should be returned without 
creating an alternative base for the American military. It is important to note that only 
2 percent of Okinawans and 3 percent of the Japanese population believe that 
relocation should occur within their prefecture. 
These numbers do not mean that Okinawans are ignorant in terms of security 
problems. Seventeen percent of Okinawans believe that Japan is extremely prone to 
invasion. The vast majority of Okinawans (64 percent) believe that the threat of 
invasion is possible. 252  These numbers show a different face of the Okinawan 
sentiment. While the majority of Okinawans would argue that bases should decrease 
and Henoko is not a suitable alternative, up to a total of 81 percent of the prefecture 
believes in a palpable security threat. This also reveals that the myth that Okinawans 
are risk-free is false; Okinawans are aware and believe in the threat posed towards 
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Japan by possibly China. Interestingly, this threat perception is not translated into 
embracing neither American presence nor the relocation of Futenma to Henoko. 
The most recent opinion poll conducted by the Okinawa Prefectural Government 
provides greater insight in what Okinawans desire. In response to the question, “Do 
you think that the fact that 74 percent of American military bases located on Okinawa 
is discrimination?” 43.7 percent answered that they believed it was discrimination and 
25.4 percent agreed that it was discrimination if they had to choose, amounting to 69.1 
percent.253  
Another question the 2016 report analyzed was the top three top priorities 
Okinawans desired both the prefectural and central government to conduct regarding 
the U.S. military bases.254 Out of all the options, the desire to return land was up at 
33.2 percent, the highest top priority of the respondents. It can be assumed that most 
deemed this as most important as land return as second and third priority experiences a 
significant drop, 4.3 and 4.7 percent respectively. The other top choices are to revise 
the U.S.-Japan SOFA (17.3 percent placed this as their first priority and 18.1 percent as 
their second priority), to decrease the number of crimes (14.8 percent placed this as 
their first priority and 17.1 percent as their second priority), to appropriately address 
criminals/victims with justice (4.4 percent placed this as their first priority while 11.5 
percent as their second priority) and to reduce noise pollution and low-flight practices 
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(11.2 percent placed this as their first priority and 14.5 percent as their second priority). 
Environmental-related questions such as establishing proper environmental plans (2.7, 
3.8 and 3.4 in that order of priority) and addressing military wastes (0.7, 1.7, and 1.6 in 
that order of priority) are significantly low when compared to the statistics above. 
Although some of the questions may have been asked to attain a certain answer, by 
observing the prefectural government’s recent analysis, it is clear that Okinawans are 
most concerned with base return as promised and individual safety from crimes 
committed by American military soldiers. 
The numbers retrieved by the central government, NHK and the prefectural 
government reveal that the marginalization argument is shared among Okinawans. As 
seen, it is interesting to observe the desire of diminishing base concentration before the 
infamous 2004 Futenma Helicopter crash and DPJ Hatoyama’s attempted failure. The 
statistics provided by the three sources reveal that Okinawans understand the dynamic 
security environment. Despite their appreciation for security provided by the United 
States and understanding of the growing threat from China, they still believe that base 
burden can be reduced. Just as the lack of Okinawan NGOs advocating environmental 
protection suggested, the statistics provided by the Prefectural government proved that 
environmental concerns were roughly around three percent. It can be concluded that 
the numbers provided by relatively interest-free parties provide quantitative support to 
the marginalization argument. Another important observation is the concern over 
individual security. Continuing opposition against the proposed FRF may not be the 
facility per se but the perception that burden is not being relieved at all. This possibility 
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would naturally connect high numbers revealing concerns over personal safety with 
belief in discrimination manifested in concentration and within prefecture base 
relocation. 
The relocation of Futenma base to another location within Okinawa fails to 
address Okinawa’s desire of decreased presence of American military bases. The FRF 
continues to be a symbol of discrimination, especially as the central government 
continues with construction regardless of opposition. From a simple observation of 
these numbers, it can be concluded that Okinawa’s Level II win-sets were never 
compatible with America’s three conditions for base relocation.   
1.4 Okinawan Gubernatorial, Nago City and Ginowan Elections 
Before making conclusion on the Okinawan perspective, it is necessary to 
review the results of the Okinawan Gubernatorial, Nago City Mayor and Ginowan City 
Mayor elections. The major points of debate for the three different elections will be 
discussed, including the voter turnout and number of votes. While observation for both 
Okinawan Gubernatorial and Nago City Mayor elections will start from 1998, numbers 
for the Ginowan City Mayor Election will be under scrutiny from 2007. The election 
held in 2007 was the first mayor election after the 2004 Helicopter Crash incident, and 
the development in the city’s attitude afterwards deserves attention. Given that the 
1995 rape occurred in Ginowan and that the anti-base mayor was reelected in the 2007 
elections, it can be assumed that the city has always been against the presence of 
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American bases. Observation of numbers should reveal whether opinions differ 
depending on region. 
1.4.1 Okinawan Gubernatorial Elections 
The 1998 gubernatorial election was the first governor election held after the 
announcement of relocating the MCAS Futenma within the prefecture. Beginning with 
the 1995 Rape, Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota continued his position against 
relocation within the prefecture. Keiichi Inamine, candidate running against the sitting 
governor, agreed in rejecting the proposed sea-based facility but was willing to 
compromise. Taking a unique position, Inamine suggested creating a new joint 
military-civilian airport that would be on a fifteen-year lease for the American 
military.255 Therefore, the two candidates had different views of the FRF. Interestingly, 
this was not the theme for the elections. Asahi Shimbun’s opinion poll conducted a 
week before the elections revealed that 51 percent of respondents viewed the 
prefecture’s economy to be the most contested topic in the gubernatorial elections.256 
Only 25 percent viewed the base problem as an important factor of voting. Inamine, 
who advocated for economic revitalization and proposing a base usable by civilians, 
won the elections. A similar atmosphere was observed in the 2002 gubernatorial 
elections. While two candidates other than Inamine opposed relocation within the 
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prefecture, most of the debate focused on Okinawa’s high unemployment debate.257 
Similar to the previous election, fifty-nine percent of respondents to Asahi Shimbun 
and Okinawa Times’ opinion poll saw economic strategy as most important, while 
only ten percent viewed the American base problem as top priority.  
With Inamine announcing that he had no interest in returning to office, the 2006 
gubernatorial election consisted of new candidates. Similar to Inamine, Hirozaku 
Nakaima opposed the V-way roadmap yet agreed on relocating the base within the 
prefecture.258 Nakaima’s main opponent, Keiko Itohazu, advocated relocating the base 
out of the country. With a difference of roughly 38,000 votes, Nakaima won the 
elections against the anti-base candidate. The Asahi Shimbun’s poll revealed that 26 
percent viewed policies on base relocation as a priority for elections.259 Just like Inaine, 
Nakaima emphasized on economic development more than the base problem during 
the campaign period. One can assume that immediate concerns triumphed prefectural 
issues with the government. 
With the rise and fall of DPJ Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Nakaima 
officially changed his position and rallied against relocation within Okinawa. Nago 
City Mayor Youichi Iha, Nakaima’s main opponent in the 2010 gubernatorial 
elections, advocated against relocation within Okinawa and advocated relocating the 
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base to Guam.260 While both candidates argued against the FRF plan, Nakaima avoided 
direct conflict with the government yet emphasized, “There is no relocation destination 
within the prefecture.”261 The third candidate, Tatsuro Kinjyou, supported the Henoko 
plan on basis on security.262 Even though both positions were available in the elections, 
the opposition candidate dominated voter share. In terms of voter interest, 49 percent 
of voters believed that economic issues were a priority while 36 percent viewed the 
base problem as important.263 When compared with the 2006 elections, there is a 10 
percent interest increase with the base problem as most important. Economic priority 
only decreased by three percent, revealing that it was still an important issue. The 2010 
election was unique because voters had to decide between candidates with a similar 
platform. 
Unlike the previous four elections, the 2014 gubernatorial election clearly 
revolved around the base issue. In response to the Asahi opinion poll, 45 percent of 
respondents believed that the base relocation issue was a top priority in the 
gubernatorial election, an increase of 9 percent from 2010.264 In comparison, economic 
concerns decreased to 38 percent, allowing the base problem to gain more attention for 
the first time. Despite campaigning against Henoko in 2010, Inamine openly supported 
the relocation in 2014. Takeshi Onaga, mayor of Naha City, adamantly opposed the 
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base relocation. The other two runners, Miko Shimoji and Soukichi Kina, argued for a 
prefectural referendum and revocation of Inamine’s permission of relocation 
respectively, leaving less of an impression on voters. 265  For the first time in a 
gubernatorial election, an anti-base candidate won victoriously against a base lenient 
candidate. 
 As seen in the gubernatorial elections, while base issues were definitely on the 
mind of voters, immediate needs took a greater priority up until 2010. This fact alone 
cannot support the conclusion that the base issue wasn’t important. As seen in Table 1, 
all elections between pro- and anti-base elections with a 40,000-vote difference, with 
2002 and 2014 as an exception. For 2002, voters probably were satisfied of the 
conclusion of the initial FRF blueprint decided between the central government and 
Okinawa. While opposed against Inamine’s promises of a fifteen-year lease and joint 
civilian military usage, the government never overrode Inamine’s demands. The 
10,000-vote difference between Onaga and Nakaima is significant. The fact that 
elections were close between pro- and anti-base candidates in 1998 and 2006 suggest 
that despite voter’s priority in economic issues, anti-base sentiment was equally strong 
to make the decisions closer than the 2002 and 2014 results. While Hatoyama’s 
influence on anti-base sentiment cannot be denied, the numbers as seen on Table 1 
suggest that the anti-base preference was already prevalent in Okinawan society. 
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Table 1. Okinawa Gubernatorial Elections 
 
Source: Created based on “Okinawa Prefecture Gubernatorial Elections: Comparison of Past Number of 
Votes and Voter Turnout [Okinawaken chiji sen kako no tokuhyousuu to touhyouritsu no suii,” Ryukyu 
Shimpo, last modified on November 7, 2010, accessed on April 22, 2017, 
http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-170144.html; “Results of Elections, Okinawa Prefecture [Senkyo 
kekka (Okinawaken)],” Senkyo Dot Com, accessed on April 22, 2017, 
http://go2senkyo.com/local/jichitai/3962. 
1.4.2 Nago City Mayor Elections 
 Nago City Mayor elections followed a similar pattern as the gubernatorial 
elections. In the 1998 elections, Tateo Kishimoto, who took a lenient position and 
declared that the ultimate decision was based on the governor not the mayor, defeated 
the anti-base candidate Yoshikazu Tamaki.266 Kishimoto was reelected in the 2002 
elections, defeating anti-base candidate Yasuhiro Miyagi. 267  Unlike the previous 
election, Kishimoto ran on the basis of supporting the relocation if it occurs on 
conditions raised by the city. In addition, this election saw a greater gap between 
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candidates with roughly 9,000 votes. The gap decreases once more in the 2006 election, 
with lenient pro-base candidate Yoshikazu Shimabukuro defeating both anti-base 
candidates Munehito Gakiya and Yoshitami Oshiro.268 As the agreed 2002 plan was 
being reevaluated, Shimabukuro argued that relocation could occur if it is done in 
response to the Nago resident’s will. The mayor’s approved V-way roadmap proved to 
be his downfall, as Susumu Inamine, who vocally ran against relocation, barely won 
the 2010 elections with 1,000-vote lead.269 Despite Governor Nakaima’s reverse on 
relocation, Inamine still defeated pro-base candidate Bunshin Suematsu in the 2014 
elections. As seen, Nago City shifted from a lenient position that allowed relocation 
with benefits to Nago City. Once the blueprint changed from the 2002 to the 2006 plan, 
voters punished Shimabukuro and supported anti-base candidate Inamine. 
 As host of the new FRF, Nago voters are most keen on the base issue rather than 
economic benefits or policy. In the 2010 elections, former mayor Shimabukuro lost on 
a platform to helping revitalizing Nago’s local economy.270 This same trend is seen in 
the 2014 elections and provides greater insight into Nago residents’ voting preference. 
With the LDP heavily supporting candidate Suematsu, Minister of Defense Shigeru 
Ishiba mentioned about establishing a “Nago Revitilization Fund of 500 million yen” 
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in hopes to encourage residents to cast their votes for the pro-base candidate.271 As 
seen in Table 2, the difference of votes between Inamine and his opponents in 2010 
and 2014 increased, suggesting that the base issue remains the fuel of Nago residents’ 
voting preference. While this trend of divergence may suggest that Hatoyama’s 
promises affected elections post-2010, the close elections in 1998, 2006, and 2010 
prove that the base issue has always been important and a key topic of division among 
voters. Despite the decreasing trend, the relatively high voter turnout also proves 
interest in shaping the future of the city.  
In conclusion, host city has never been clearly for or against accepting the FRF 
into their district; if anything, voters were willing to accept a base with benefits up to 
Shimabukuro’s election. However, Shimabukuro compliance to the 2006 blueprint 
plan probably decreased base lenient voters for an anti-base candidate. The growing 
support of Inamine seen from the transition of 2010 to 2014 reveals that rather than 
clear economic assistance, the citizens prefer being respected and heard by the 








                                                
271 Shigeru Ishiba quoted in “Re-examining the 50 Billion Yen Fund [500 okuen kikin minaoshi 
genkyuu],” The Asahi Shimbun, January 20, 2014. 
 
90 
Table 2. Nago City Mayor Elections 
 
Source: Created based on “Results of Elections, Nago City [Senkyo kekka (Nago shi)],” Senkyo Dot Com, 
accessed on April 22, 2017, http://go2senkyo.com/local/jichitai/3970.  
1.4.3 Ginowan City Mayor Elections 
 Ginowan, the district with the MCAS Futenma, has maintained its position 
against relocation within the prefecture. In the 2007 elections, Youichi Iha, sitting 
mayor of Ginowan city, argued that the air base had to be relocated to the United States 
of America.272 Opponent Shingi Hokama argued that relocation to Henoko must be 
admitted in order to reduce burden from Ginowan. Regardless of his argument, the out 
of prefecture candidate won the elections.273 This trend continues in both 2010 and 
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2012.274 Ginowan’s position was challenged in the 2016 elections, with mayor Atsushi 
Sakima alternating his position from his 2012 platform and voiced out that Futenma 
had to be relocated as soon as possible, implying that Henoko was a viable 
alternative.275 Keiichiro Shimura, candidate supported by Governor Onaga, advocated 
for both Futenma’s unconditional reversion and against the Henoko relocation. Despite 
his argument that echoed previous platform promises in Ginowan City, Shimura lost 
by a large margin. 
 The most important observation in the Ginowan City is the sudden change in 
voter preference in the 2016 elections. Just like the 2007 elections, mayor Sakima 
subtly implied that Henoko was a viable alternative while running on a platform of 
relocating Futenma as soon as possible. The main source of debate revolved around 
whether the Futenma Air Base was to be relocated to Henoko or another alternative. 
Despite having candidates opposing Henoko up to 2012, voters allowed a candidate 
who is lenient with the Henoko to win by an unprecedented margin, as seen in Table 3. 
This change may be interpreted that Ginowan voters became worried of possible 
koteika of the air base.  
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Table 3. Ginowan City Mayor Election 
 
Source: Created based on Ginowan-City Hall, “Past Election Results [Kakono senkyo kekka],” Ginowan 
City, last modified in 2016, accessed on April 25, 2017, 
http://www.city.ginowan.okinawa.jp/sisei/election/02/h28sityoukakosennkyo.html. 
1.5 Marginalization, Opinion Polls and Election Results 
From both opinion polls and election results, it can be concluded that out of the 
two popular arguments, marginalization takes precedence. Opinion polls conducted by 
the central government, NHK, and the prefectural government proves that Okinawans 
desire decreased presence of bases from an early stage of the Futenma base reversion 
dialogue. This trend is challenged to a certain extent when observing the crucial points 
of debate for the gubernatorial elections. As seen in both gubernatorial and Nago 
elections, economic incentives were equally important to voters.  
On the prefectural level, emphasis and concerns the future of the Futenma base 
gradually garnered interest, eventually surpassing economic concerns in the 2014 
elections. This does not mean that Okinawans lack interest in the base issue. 
Regardless of the evidence that Okinawans viewed the economy with greater value 
than the base issue, the elections were competitive with roughly a 40,000-vote 
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difference. The only anomalies are the 2002 election of Keiichi Inamine and the 2014 
election of Takeshi Onaga. The same can be applied to Nago City. It can be observed 
that Nago residents will not accept a base that lacks conditions voters desire, as seen in 
Shimabukuro’s eventual acceptance of the Henoko Bay plan rather than Inamine and 
former Nago Mayor Kishimoto’s on-sea facility. Ginowan City, host of the air base, 
remained anti-Henoko until the most recent election in 2016. While reelected mayor 
Sakima had not explicitly mentioned Henoko as an alternative, he had not denied the 
location as well. It can be assumed that the lawsuits between the central and local 
government affected elections. The possibility of the central government’s victory may 
have concerned and jolted voters to choose a candidate that can avoid Futenma base’s 
stablization.  
Table 4. Comparison of Elections 
 
Source: Created based on information as provided in Chapter IV 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3. 
 Provided statistics prove that while opinions within Okinawa are diverse, there is 
a common trend in the desire of decreasing base presence. The high interest in 
revitalizing the local economy explains the central government’s attempt to persuade 
the prefecture to accept relocation by providing economic stimulus packages via 
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synergistic linkage with the FRF. However, polls from the early twenty-first century 
prove that regardless of economic incentives, the majority of Okinawans will not 
accept the FRF in Henoko. While Onaga’s “All Okinawa” argument cannot be justified 
in explaining Okinawan sentiment as a whole, information provided in this section 
proves Okinawa’s low win-set has been consistent. Factors such as Hatoyama’s failure 
and Nakaima’s surprising acceptance did not change Okinawa’s position. 
2. Negative Reverberation? External Factors and Low Win-sets 
Statistics seen above prove that the majority of Okinawans are against the 
proposed FRF. The central government, especially with Nakaima, pursued a 
synergistic linkage between the FRF and economic incentives in order to make the 
prefecture submit to the alliance’s demands. Regardless of increased benefits, Okinawa 
remained resilient.  
While win-sets are determined by the conflict or consensus among the diverse 
preferences of local constituents, other factors such as Level I strategy and 
international pressure can positively or negatively affect Level II win-sets. In the case 
of Okinawa, immature SACO Final Report implementation, American military crimes 
and accidents, Japanese politicians self-tarnishing comments and ambiguity all 
negatively affect Okinawa’s position on the FRF. 
2.1 Actions Falling Short: Implementation of the SACO Final Report 
Since Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, the American military endeavored in base 
reduction. With the 1996 document, it was agreed that the United States would return 
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the folllowing eleven facilities to Okinawa: Futenma, 4000 hectares of Camp 
Gonsalves (Northern Training Area), Aha Training Area, Gimbaru Training Area, 
Sobe Communications Site, Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, Senaha Communications 
Station, Camp Kuwae (also known as Camp Lester), Makiminato Service Area, Naha 
Port, and housing consolidations on Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran (also known as 
Camp Foster).276 Most of the land had a decided reversion date. In addition to land 
reversion, the report included other agreements that included adjusting training and 
operational procedures, noise reduction, and improving the SOFA procedures in 
general. This section reviews land reversion that occurred in the order listed above. 
The Northern Training Area was originally planned to be returned “by the end of 
March 2003” under the condition of providing land and water area “in order to ensure 
access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.”277 Just like the delay 
for most facilities, reversion did not occur until 22 December 2016. When the 
reversion was actualized, at the reversion ceremony, the Prime Minister of Japan 
commented, “The reversion of 4000 hectares of the Northern Training Area has been a 
task took twenty years. [The government] desires to continue accomplishing results by 
maintaining deterrence while steadily reducing burden on Okinawa.” 278  U.S. 
Ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy commended the reversion as “an important 
step towards the realignment [of U.S. forces].”279 As a condition of returning the 
Northern Training Area, Japan was required to create six helipads in the southern part 
                                                
276 “The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996.” 
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278 Shinzo Abe quoted in Ishimatsu, “Majority of Northern Training” 
279 Caroline Kennedy quoted in Ibid.. 
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of the remaining area, resulting in negatively affecting communities living near the 
facility.280 While it is true that base presence would decrease from 74.5 percent to 70.6 
percent, critics argue that the alliance failed to decrease overall burden with this deal. 
Perhaps the most damaging report to both America and Japan’s effort is the 
United States Marine Corps’ “Marine Corps Installations Pacific 2025 Strategic 
Vision.” In this particular report that explained the direction of the Marines in the 
coming decade, the military wrote that “approximately 51% of the unusable Northern 
Training Area (NTA) will be returned to GOJ [Government of Japan], additional 
available training acreage will be developed where possible, making full use of 
MCIPAC’s [Marine Corps Installations Pacific] finite land acreage.”281 With the report 
claiming that the returned land to Okinawa was “unusable” for the Marines, it 
delegitimizes the efforts of burden reduction and implies that unnecessary land was 
returned to the Okinawans. Whether this was the perspective when the Final Report 
was negotiated, the Marines’ independent document questions the intentions behind 
the largest reversion to Okinawa. 
Both Aha Training Area, approximately 480 hectares, and Gimbaru Training 
Area, approximately 60 hectares, was originally planned with reversion by the end of 
                                                
280 Hisashi Ishimatsu, “Reversion of the Northern Training Area, Largest Return Since Okinawa’s 
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March 1998.282 The former training area was delayed by nine months due to the 
conditions of accepting the land and water area access for the Northern Training area, 
resulting in reversion on 22 December 1998.283 The conditions for latter training area 
required a helicopter landing zone relocation to the Kin Blue Beach Training Area and 
facility relocations to Camp Hansen. This was significantly delayed due to the Kin 
Town mayor’s late acceptance of the return conditions in 2007.284 With relocation that 
occurred in afterwards, the land was returned on 31 July 2011. 285  The Sobe 
Communication Site, approximately 53 hectares, with a planned reversion by the end 
of March 2001, was eventually returned in December 2006.286 Yomitan Auxiliary 
Airfield, approximately 191 hectares, had the same reversion date as the 
communication site and returned in December 2006. Another facility, the Senaha 
Communication Station with approximately 61 hectares, which had a reversion date of 
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Table 5. Facilities returned to Okinawan jurisdiction 
 
Source: Created based on Japan Ministry of Defense, “Part III: Measures for Defense of Japan, Chapter 2 
Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, Section 3 Measures Relating to the Presence of 
U.S. Forces in Japan,” in DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2011, last modified in 2011, accessed on May 1, 2017, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/34Part3_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf. 
 
The remaining facilities – Camp Kuwae, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port 
Facility, and housing consolidation for Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran – all had 
reversion dates by March 2008, were revised in the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment 
Implementation.287 It was now promised that Camp Kuwae would be a total reversion 
rather than partial. Rough dates were clarified with the April 2013 announcement made 
by the second Abe administration. Most of the remaining facilities, including the 
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, will only be returned to Okinawan jurisdiction 
after the proper implementation of the FRF.288 Despite the alliance’s recent agreement 
to delink land reversion with the FRF, the linkage between the FRF and most 
remaining facilities seems contradictory. With Futenma air base’s reversion to be 
Japanese financial year 2022 or later, the other facilities range from Japanese financial 
year 2022 to 2028 or later. However, the government announced their intention to 
                                                
287 “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.” 
288 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa April 
2013,” last modified in April 2013, accessed on May 1, 2017, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/zaibeigun/saihen/pdf/20130405_okicon_plan_e.pdf, 27.  
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finish the landfill within five years and it was reported that the whole facility might 
take at least nine and a half years, resulting as anticipated completion by financial year 
2026.289  
Table 6. Facilities linked with the FRF 
 
Source: Created based on Japan Ministry of Defense, “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in 
Okinawa April 2013.” 
 
For promises other than land reversion, both governments have been making 
changes in a speedy matter. For example, the artillery live-firing training over 
Highway 104 that is one of the three 1993 Okinawa Prefecture three important factors 
was relocated by the promised financial year 1997.290 The alliance installed noise 
reduction baffles at Kadena Base to decrease noise pollution. The promised relocation 
of the KC-130 Aerial Refuel aircrafts were not given a specific date, and was finally 
transferred to Iwakuni Air Base in 2014. Promises to improve certain aspects of the 
U.S.-Japan SOFA procedures such as accident reports and visits to U.S. facilities and 
areas were changed as well. While burdens such as noise pollution and American 
                                                
289 “[Extra] Landfill of Henoko to Begin: Prefecture to retaliate, construction of seawall and 
largest facility since Okinawa’s reversion [‘gougai’ Henoko umetate hajimaru gogan kouji, ken wa 
hanpatsu fukkigo saidai no kichi kensetsu he],” Okinawa Times, last modified on April 25, 2017, accessed 
on April 25, 2017, http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/94777. 
290 Morimoto, 203-206. 
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accidents and crimes may still continue, overall, non-facility related promises stated in 
the SACO Final Report were implemented in a timely manner. 
The implementation of the SACO Final Report has been a mixture of results. 
Out of the 11 facilities, 6 have been successfully returned. In addition, partial return of 
two facilties was revised as a full reversion in 2006. However, all successful reversions 
only occurred after the promised date. Although linkage of reversion and the FRF 
implementation were eliminated in April 2012, the consolidation plan proposed by the 
Japanese government in April 2013 linked most of the remaining facilities to the FRF, 
which will most likely result in reversion by late 2020s if not the 2030s. Both 
governments have championed the 4000 hectares reversion of the Northern Training 
Area as an important step towards burden reduction. This too is questionable given the 
Marines discrediting the usability of the land. In terms of revisions regarding non-land 
related issues such as practices and noise reduction, implementations were made before 
entering the twenty-first century. Despite these implementations, it is true that noise 
pollution and crimes still remain a big concern in Okinawa, thus discrediting these 
initiatives. Progress in reversion may be occurring, but the immature implementation 
of the SACO Final Report is likely to be unsatisfactory for the Okinawans. 
2.2 American Military Accidents: Reminders of “Colonialism” 
The United States of America repeatedly reminds the Japanese government and 
Okinawans that the FRF is the “only solution” to the relocation problem. As originally 
stated in the 1996 SACO Final Report, the negotiated facility is “the best option in 
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terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while 
maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces.”291 Provided statistics prove that 
Okinawans do not view the proposed FRF as a facility that is beneficial for their own 
lives. If this facility is truly beneficial for Okinawans, the American government must 
be able to further prove its liability. However, the American government’s lack of 
responsibility regarding Okinawan safety is one factor that fosters Okinawan cynicism 
against the American government. 
Statistics introduced in the previous section regarding Okinawan opinion 
testifies that individual safety is one major concern of the residents. Official numbers 
provided by the Okinawa Prefecture reveal that there have been approximately 4,790 
different crimes committed by American soldiers from 1972 to 1995.292 The number of 
crimes has definitely seen a decreasing trend, with the amount of offensives against 
individuals not exceeding ten per year since 1986. The number of theft also decreased 
to fewer than 50 accounts per year since 1995. Overall, the amount of American 
related crimes have decreased. However, decreasing incidents fail to translate into the 
Okinawan perception of safety. This is due to American response towards both 
American related crimes and military accidents. 
The most recent notorious murder occurred in May 2016. Rina Shimabukuro, 
20-year-old employee, was raped murdered by retired Marine veteran Kenneth 
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Franklin Shinzato.293 When asked by press about the United States’ opinion on the 
relation of this incident to the base relocation, the Department of State reminded the 
audience that the incident “angers us.”294 In response to the incident, former President 
Barack Obama reassured Japan and Okinawa that “[the United States is] committed to 
doing everything we can to prevent any crimes from taking place of this sort.”295 
Interestingly, Prime Minister Abe, for the first time, publically reprimanded Obama for 
the crime committed by the retired veteran, claiming that he “firmly lodged a protest 
against President Obama” and “urged the United States to make sure to take effective 
and thorough means to prevent a recurrence, and vigorously and strictly address the 
situation.”296  
With the Japanese government criticizing their ally, both governments came to 
an agreement to limit legal immunity of American soldiers when committed crimes. 
The new agreement, which was signed before former President Obama left office in 
January 2017, now allows Japan to prosecute both military and civilian personnel 
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when accused of crime.297 While this agreement is a significant step towards legal 
equality, it also questionable how and why military and civilian personnel enjoyed 
immunity for the previous decades.  
Crime rates have decreased over time and American personnel have been active 
in deepening relations with the local community. Unfortunately, American response to 
serious crimes tends to be lacking. On 13 March 2016, U.S. Navy sailor Justin 
Castellanos, 24, found a Japanese female tourist from Fukuoka sleeping in a hotel 
hallway, and took her to his room and sexually assaulted her.298 He was sentenced with 
30 months of hard labor as punishment.299 With Castellanos admitting the crime, 
United States Marine Corps lieutenant general Lawrence D. Nicholson visited Onaga 
and claimed the incident as regrettable.300 Okinawan media reported that Nicholson 
claimed, “There has been no large incidents since [my] arrival half a year ago.... [This 
incident] is extremely embarrassing for us,” without directly making an apology 
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towards the victim.301 Throughout the twenty-minute conference, Nicholson repeatedly 
emphasized that the United States was a good neighbor. In response to Nicholson’s 
speech, Onaga replied, “The practice of being a good neighbor has not been attempted 
in my honest opinion.”302 The military may believe that they are responding in a good 
manner, but from an Okinawan perspective, Americans fails to exert responsibility. 
Although serious crimes may taint American responsibility, one piece of 
evidence that actually bolsters American responsibility is their response to alcohol 
abuse. Alcohol restrictions were placed on all military personnel based in Japan from 
25 November 2012 to 16 November 2012 in response to military personnel who 
intruded on private property at night.303 In response to a gang rape that occurred on 
Okinawa in October 2012, the military restricted base leave at night and imposed a 
new curfew that relates to military rank in February 2013.304 From 20 May 2013, 
alcohol consumption out of base was eased to two cans of beer out of base.305 
Restrictions were further eased from 9 December 2014, allowing personnel to drink 
freely out of base with the same curfew in place. Interestingly, these changes were in 
response to the local business owners’ request that have been financially affected with 
the ban. Numbers of crimes and driving under the influence of alcohol have decreased 
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during the original ban. Similar restrictions were placed again in response to 
Shimabukuro’s murder. Nicholson placed specific restrictions on leave out of bases 
from 27 May 2016 to 24 June 2016.306 The restrictions placed a curfew for military 
personnel at 00:00 A.M. and banned alcohol consumption out of the base facilities. In 
terms of irresponsible drinking, the military responded appropriately by placing 
restrictions on consumption. However, similar to the revisions of legal immunity, 
significant changes have been imposed in recent years. Initiatives of keeping American 
soldiers should continue to be seriously observed. 
Another realm that is equally important to the crimes committed in Okinawa is 
military accidents. From Okinawa Reversion in 1972 to 2013, there have been 45 
accidents of American military aircraft crashes in Okinawa.307 While the number of 
accident has significantly decreased over the years, the nature of aviation resumption 
has been questioned. For example, on 5 August 2013, HH-60 Helicopter, which 
conducts aviation practices above both bases and civilian neighborhoods, crashed 
within Camp Hansen.308 Without releasing reasons for the helicopter’s failure, the 
same helicopter’s operations resumed eleven days after the accident.309 In defense of 
resuming practices before releasing information, Camp Hansen officials responded that 
they had to resume before the skills of the pilots weaken. A similar accident occurred 
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on 12 August 2015 when a MH-60 Helicopter crashed in the coast of Okinawa.310 Out 
of the seventeen individuals on the aircraft, seven were injured and sent to the navy 
hospital. Similar to the previous incident, the American military resumed operations 
from 18 August prior to releasing information regarding failure. 311  While it is 
understandable that practice of military aircraft is important for maintaining the skills 
of pilots, it is also worrisome for citizens to witness aircrafts to resume operation 
without proper explanation. 
The most recent accident is the Osprey accident that occurred on 13 December 
2016. At 21:50 at Nago bay, MV-22 Osprey crashed 300 meters away from civilian 
neighborhood, resulting in two out of five personnel injured.312  At midnight 14 
December, Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada announced that the United States told 
Japan that the pilot deliberately crashed the aircraft into the bay. While this comment 
received severe backlash from the Okinawans, her statement may be justifiable given 
that the accident avoided the neighborhood. When meeting the lieutenant governor of 
Okinawa, Lawrence D. Nicholson argued, “The pilot did not harm the neighbor and its 
residents. This deserves appreciation.”313 After the meeting, the lieutenant governor 
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revealed that there was no form of apology from Nicholson and commented, “I really 
felt [his] unsuppressed colonial mentality.”314 This incident was one of the reasons why 
Governor Takeshi Onaga decided not to attend the reversion ceremony of the Northern 
Training Area. Regardless of this serious incident, Osprey operations were resumed 
from 19 December, six days since the accident.315 Unlike the helicopter accidents, the 
American Marine released that the blade of the Osprey struck the hose of an aerial 
tanker, resulting in the accident. Even if the aircraft itself did not experience 
malfunctions, the fact that several aircraft failures have occurred on an annual basis 
since 2013 is unnerving. 
Other than direct crashes, incidents of unauthorized landings by American 
aircrafts on private property in Okinawa bolsters the perception of American 
colonialism. For example, on 15 September 2016, one UH-60 Helicopter suddenly 
landed on a civilian factory’s parking lot due to bad weather.316 Another unauthorized 
landing occurred on 21 January 2017, drawing further protest by civilians.317 Both 
landings have been conducted due to the pilot’s judgment regarding safety. However, 
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such unauthorized landings on civilian property exacerbate skepticism towards the 
American military and fosters the feelings that perhaps Okinawa is America’s colony. 
American caused crimes and accidents are a headache for the American military 
and the central governments, especially as talks of the FRF has been stalled over the 
previous years. Overall, when looking at statistics, military related crimes continue to 
decrease and are at its lowest point in history. Alcohol consumption and base leaves 
are monitored by the military, and military accidents continue to decrease as well. In 
this sense, it may seem like the United States of America is exerting responsibility in 
relation to their commitment of protecting the Okinawan’s quality of life.  
Unfortunately, most responses to resolve issues are merely reactions to accidents 
that have occurred. While important, decreasing crime rates itself cannot create a 
responsible imagery of the American military with rapes and murders that still occur 
on an annual basis. In addition, despite its decreasing trend, military accidents have 
started to occur on an annual basis since 2013. It is understandable that military 
practices must be continued in order to maintain deterrence in the region. To do that in 
exchange with Okinawan trust, however, will only tamper the American image on the 
island. American action has suggested that maintaining the military’s projection and 
power takes precedence over Okinawa safety. 
2.3 Japanese Language and Ambiguity: Shooting oneself in the foot 
If the United States negatively affect Okinawa’s win-set with military crimes 
and accidents, the LDP alienate the residents by tarnished their reputation through 
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occasional events that reflect their ally’s irresponsibility. For example, in June 2015, 
novelist Naoki Hyakuta, close friend of the Shinzo Abe, participated in a LDP 
gathering as a special lecturer and commented, “Two newspapers in Okinawa should 
be put out of business for their criticism of the central government's policy on the U.S. 
base issue.”318 In response to Hyakuta’s comment at a LDP sponsored gathering, Abe 
mentioned that it was regretful and did not reflect the LDP’s stance. While Hyakuta 
himself is not a politician, the fact that a guest lecturer at a LDP gathering spoke 
against Okinawa proved problematic. Head editors at both Okinawa Timse and 
Ryukyu Shimpo published a joint statement against Hyakuta, labeling his comment 
promoting suppression of speech.319 Regardless of criticism from Abe and other LDP 
ministers, Hyakuta’s comment is one example of smearing the LDP’s image. 
Other comments made by LDP ministers themselves have also tampered LDP’s 
reputation. When questioned by President Obama about the rescinding of lawsuits in 
March 2016, Abe responded that the government chose reconciliation with the 
Japanese proverbs of “taking things slowly” (isogaba maware).320 In response to Abe’s 
comment towards Obama, Onaga criticized, “The consultations are based on striving 
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for an amicable settlement is the gist of the reconciliation agreement, [and such 
comment] undermines the spirit of reconciliation.”321 
Perhaps the most recent incident that ruined the reputation of the LDP in 
Okinawa was Yosuke Tsuruho’s ambiguous stance of racial slurs used against 
Okinawans. In October 2016, when facing demonstrators near the sites of helipad 
construction in the southern areas of the Northern Training Area, two guards from 
Osaka Prefecture yelled against the demonstrators calling them dojin and shinajin.322 
While Suga commented that the usage of such language is extremely disappointing, 
Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Minister Yosuke 
Tsuruho claimed that he was not in the position to claim that such action was wrong.323 
He further escalated the situation by claiming, “Whether this is a human rights problem 
or not, a third party member [like myself] making a decision is extremely dangerous. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of speech.”324 When asked whether this “dojin 
problem” failed to understand Okinawan sentiment, the minister replied, “I am not in 
the position to decide whether [that comment] undermines Okinawan sentiment or 
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not.”325 On 18 November, the government decided that the minister did not need to 
apologize.326 The government failed to properly address a blatantly racial comment, 
thus allowing anger to fuel against them. 
While the comment by a guest lecturer to a LDP gathering is still problematic, 
comments made by LDP ministers themselves invigorate an irresponsible image of the 
government. The government may act responsible by only pushing the relocation under 
consent or legal authority. The government may also use language that is pleasing to 
the ear. However, small comments such as the ones previously mentioned ruins any 
initiative taken by the government and thus perpetuate Okinawan resentment. The 
ambiguity in the Japanese government towards Okinawan sentiment, as reflected in the 
blueprint decisions and in the current Abe administration, has contributed to the 
stagnation to relocation. 
The lack of sufficient explanation also exacerbates the relocation problem. Both 
governments continue to rearticulate the necessity of reducing the burdens on Okinawa 
and maintain deterrence. In particular, as previously mentioned, the Japanese 
government continuously articulates three reasons for justifying the relocation: 1) 
Deterrence, 2) Strengthening of the US-Japan Alliance, and 3) Reducing the burden on 
Okinawa. However, these arguments have remained vague and irresponsible, as the 
public opinion polls revealed that Okinawans do not agree with the governmental 
reasons. While Abe had admitted “the needs of national security have placed a heavy 
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burden on the people of Okinawa,” he has not stopped to explain in what manner it is 
necessary.327 By insinuating that the construction of Henoko reveals commitment to the 
US-Japan alliance, Abe tried to relate the necessity of the base to the alliance.328 As 
seen in the Joint Statements, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) also focused 
more on what the American and Japanese government have accomplished rather than 
addressing on the problem and issue that remain.329  
The Okinawan public opinion polls might explain why the government has been 
hesitant on providing sufficient explanation. Given that the Okinawans have resisted 
for the past twenty years and current polls reveal this continuing trend, the government 
may be hesitant in rearticulating the necessity of Henoko. Rather than debating and 
convincing the majority of Okinawans that Henoko is the only solution, the current 
government has avoided direct conversation of the relocation by emphasizing on the 
bright future of the prefecture. The LDP has more or less given up on winning over the 
Okinawans by convincing them of the necessity of Henoko; rather, they prefer to win 
over Okinawan consent by providing economic incentives. When looking at the 
numbers, economic assistance increased the year after Nakaima accepted the 
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relocation.330  The amount of financial aid decrease during the years of Onaga’s 
appointment, suggesting that gestures against the government could lead to less 
assistance.331 It may be natural to avoid addressing the Okinawans about the necessity 
of the base, especially given the high number of disapproval. However, the 
government’s lack of addressing and engaging in dialogue with Okinawans and usage 
of vague arguments has worked in further exacerbate the already isolated Okinawan 
perspective. 
3. Returning to Win-sets 
The relocation of Futenma base received greater disapproval than acceptance. 
While the alliance proposed reversion of the base in hopes to decrease burden, the 
proposal of creating a FRF within Okinawa resulted in resistance. A comprehensive 
perspective on the base relocation issue is necessary in understanding whether 
relocation was possible or not. 
3.1 Moments of Cooperation? Illusions of Overlapping Win-sets 
A comparative observation of relocation discussions at different points 
throughout the twenty years prove that American and Okinawan win-sets never 
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overlapped. The Okinawan government considered accepting the FRF in 2002 and 
2006 with certain conditions. In response, the alliance did not accept those conditions. 
Perceived cooperation of relocation under Inamine and Nakaima can be concluded as 
illusions of overlapping win-sets. Even when Nakaima accepted the FRF in 2013, it 
should be noted that he was against the FRF in its current form for seven years. If he 
remained loyal to his position, the current relocation landfill and construction would 
have not occurred. As seen below in Table 7, both constituents never reached a 
realistic compromise. 
Table 7. Comparison of FRF Positions 
 
3.2 Stagnant Win-sets 
It it can be concluded that the win-sets of the alliance and Okinawa hardly 
shifted. As mentioned in chapter 3, the three American conditions to relocate Futenma 
within Okinawa, to not consolidate the FRF to an existing facility, and to maintain the 
equal level of security remains significant for their relocation plans. On the other hand, 
opinion polls and evolving trends in local elections reveal that decreasing base 
presence is in the interest of Okinawans. Inamine’s compromise in 2002 reveals this 
sentiment of reduced burden by imposing limited usage as one of the conditions. 
Nakaima’s proposal of relocating the base out into the sea reflects Inamine’s 
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achievement of the original blueprint, which placed the FRF 2.2 kilometers from 
Henoko.332 The location of the FRF is important, as the December 2016 Osprey 
incident proved to threaten Okinawans. Nakaima’s new conditions in 2013 and 
eventual acceptance should be considered an anomaly, as his defeat in the 2014 
gubernatorial election resulted in the largest win margin in recent history.333 
Putnam’s three factors that affect win-sets explain Okinawa’s rigid position. 
Diversity in Okinawa did not result in heterogeneous preferences, but rather 
homogeneity. Economic incentives, while inducing, failed to divide the prefecture. The 
democratic procedure of executing construction hindered the central government from 
forcing landfill until Nakaima’s approval. The government’s explanation of base 
relocation and alliance strength failed to convince the Okinawans to accept the 
proposed FRF. Not only has Okinawa’s win-set been limited from 1996, but also the 
alliance failed to induce expansion or modification of conditions. 
On the contrary of expansion, the central governments succeeded in continued 
alienation of the Okinawan public. While the military endeavors to connect with the 
local community in a good manner, crimes and accidents easily nullify efforts. 
Continued crimes and accidents remind Okinawans that bases in any form and any 
location would eventually turn into a threat if located within the prefecture. Enticing 
speeches on burden reduction are vain in light of Japanese politicians tarnishing their 
image of responsibility. Avoiding direct conversation results in frustration as well. 
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Initiatives such as economic development packages, while welcomed, failed to change 
Okinawa’s opinion on American bases. The alliance has successfully created 
skepticism, resulting in negative reverberation. 
In the same manner, the United States and Japan failed to expand their 
conditions as well. While Japan knew that Okinawa would resist, the country believed 
in America’s sacrosanct conditions. The United States never showed intention to 
compromise within prefecture relocation. The Hatoyama administration’s challenge of 
America’s limited conditions resulted in reaffirming the conditions importance. From 
an American perspective, Henoko proved to be the “only solution” for Futenma base. 
Rather than fighting on behalf of Okinawa, the Japanese government believed in the 
absolute necessity of Henoko and thus determined to create the FRF in Henoko bay. 
The American bureaucrat’s continued defense of the FRF and the Japanese 
government’s continued emphasis on relocation reaffirms the alliance’s commitment to 
fulfilling their Level 1 agreement. 
As seen throughout the whole thesis, the range of consent between Okinawa and 
the alliance is significantly minuscule. Both parties failed to convince the other to 
readjust the conditions of negotiations, which resulted as a stalemate. The alliance 
decided to continue with relocation hoping that Okinawa would eventually concede to 
the Henoko proposal. The alliance’s belief in the superiority and necessity of security 
took precedence over compromising and reliving burden for Okinawans. The obdurate 
characteristic of both the alliance and prefecture resulted in a lengthy, tedious period of 
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negotiation. It is unfortunate to witness the proposal that engendered from altruism to 
foster frustration, skepticism, and convulsion. 
4. The Future of Relocation 
The relocation of Futenma will occur, albeit the completion date remains 
undecided. A determined relocation should not prevent observers from reevaluating the 
conditions of both the alliance and Okinawa. Resentment will continue to be prevalent 
in Okinawa with the forcible relocation contrary to the resident’s will. In order to 
question whether strict conditions are necessary in order to achieve each party’s 
agenda, this section will end with questioning America’s three conditions and 
Okinawa’s out-of-prefecture position. 
4.1. Changes in Security? Questioning the FRF’s Conditions 
For the past twenty years, both American and Japanese government justified the 
FRF in terms of security. As already mentioned throughout the thesis, both 
governments articulate the importance of the FRF as an alternative to the deterrence 
provided by the MCAS Futenma. However, intellectuals have questioned whether the 
proposed FRF will provide necessary deterrence. At the first hearing of the first legal 
suit between the prefecture and central government, Onaga referred to Joseph Nye, 
former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and 
Mike Mochizuki, associate professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs of 
The George Washington University, when making an argument against the FRF’s 
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promised deterrence.334 Therefore, it is worthy to investigate the security argument 
against the FRF relocation stimulated by academics. 
In his defense at the first hearing, Onaga primarily referred to Nye’s contribution 
to the security debate by questioning whether the current FRF could deter threat from 
Chinese missiles. 335  Onaga argued that the nature of Ospreys being aircraft of 
transportation would not contribute to deterrence. The governor also referred to a 
conversation with Minister of Defense Gen Natakani questioning how Japan would 
respond to a missile attack. Nakatani responded that Japan would respond to a missile 
attack with missiles, which, in the realm of international security studies, is the 
equivalent of hitting a bullet with another bullet. Nye previously argued that the 
physical presence of the American troops on Okinawa is an assurance of the nuclear 
umbrella.336 Whether implying that deterrence itself might be decaying or not, he 
argued that American presence on Okinawa might not be effective with a growing 
Chinese military: “As China invests in advanced ballistic missiles, the fixed bases on 
Okinawa become increasingly vulnerable.”337 Mochizuki also made the same analysis 
that expanding Chinese might in align with their Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy will 
threaten American presence on Okinawa.338 The rising threat of China may nullify the 
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deterring potential of the FRF, if not challenge the projection of American forces in the 
Pacific. 
Others questioned whether the nature of the facility itself is well adequate. 
Kazuhisa Ogawa, Specially appointed professor at the Global Center for Asian and 
Regional Research of University of Shizuoka, argued that the FRF is unrealistic and 
economically devastating.339 He explained that the 1800-meter runway planned for the 
current FRF at Henoko is too short for aircrafts utilized at Futenma Air Base, such as 
the Antonov An-124 Ruslan, which requires at least 2500 meters.340 Ogawa proposed 
creating a facility within Camp Hansen and modifying and utilizing Camp Hansen’s 
runway as an adequate alternative. In addition to the short runway, the location of the 
new facility would also put aircrafts at risk of tsunamis.  
Conservative historian Eldridge also argued along the similar line.341 With the 
experience of serving as the deputy director for government and external affairs for 
Marine Corps Installations Command-Pacific located in Okinawa from 2009 to 2015, 
Eldridge argued that the current plan would not reduce burden on Okinawan residents 
due to geographic proximity. He also explained that usually 305 meters of a runway is 
designed for a safety zone, thus resulting as an actual usage of less than 1500 meters of 
the planned runaway. As an alternative, he believed that creating a base near Katsuren, 
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Uruma would be most suitable.342 A plan originally proposed by Norio Ota, honorary 
president of the Okinawa Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Katsuren 
Construction is a proposal to create an artificial base near the Katsuren region. 
Eldridge argued that the shore near Katsuren consists of dead corals and is relatively 
shallow, thus provides advantages for base creation.343 However, as the historian 
himself mentioned, the proposal lacks support because it advocates for a creation of an 
entirely new base, whereas the current Henoko plan is within the geographical 
jurisdiction of Camp Schwab.344 Whether conservative or not, these two academics 
argued that the facility itself has fundamental flaws and might not provide full support 
the American military would need for operation. 
Perhaps the most recent work on the presence of American bases on Okinawa 
and its relation to deterrence is the Tokyo-based think tank New Diplomacy Initiative’s 
publication. Kyouji Yanagizawa, former researcher and bureucrat at the Ministry of 
Defense, argued that the Marines do not contribute to deterrence.345 According to 
Yanagizawa, Americans have previously shown an attitude that they would not 
dispatch Marines if the Senkaku Islands come under Chinese attack. This attitude itself 
defeats the purpose of deterrence. In addition, he critiqued that Abe’s explanation of 
bolstering the strength of the Self Defense Force for the purpose of anti-submarine 
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strategy and defense of the American bases reveals distrust in American provided 
deterrence.  
Referring Yukio Okamoto, former Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, Mike 
Mochizuki agreed that it is highly unlikely that the United States and China would go 
into war for an uninhabited island.346  However, Mochizuki criticized Okamoto’s 
analysis due to the lack of explanation on how diminishing the presence of Marines 
would contribute to reducing deterrence. In addition, China continues to physically 
threatening the Senkaku Islands through boats and aviation, which undermines the 
deterrence argument. After analyzing three other Japanese military annalists, 
Mochizuki concluded that all authors focus on commitment and trust rather than 
practical assessment. Given the likelihood that marines will have a minimal role in 
situations of actual combat outbreak and that recent provocations have not been 
deterred by the marine’s presence (e.g. North Korean Nuclear tests, scrambles with 
Chinese jets over the Senkakus, etc.), Mochizuki questioned whether the proposed FRF 
can really provide deterrence to Japan.347 For Mochizuki, the current pacific plan of the 
American military with rotating Marines already provides deterrence, and thus the FRF 
would only end as a financial and political burden for all three parties. In conclusion, 
Mochizuki proposed an alternative: the creation of a helipad within Camp Schwab and 
the usage of the currently constructed Naha Airport’s second runway in times of 
emergency. 
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The other authors of the same publication also reminded readers of the 
decreasing number of Marines and the U.S.-Japan effort to further decrease their 
presence on Okinawa. While there were roughly 21,000 Marines on Okinawa at the 
end of the Cold War, the current official number is at 18,000 individuals and is 
planned to decrease to 9000.348 The decreasing trend alone does not question the role 
of Marines on Okinawa. While the 4th and 12th Marine Regiment and the 31st Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are based in Okinawa, the 4th Marine Regiment will be 
relocated to Guam by 2020.349 The authors note that the 31st MEU is out of Okinawa 
for roughly nine months on an annual basis due to joint trainings. The same applies for 
the 12th Marine Regiment, which spends more than six months per year to train on 
mainland Japan. At a 2 plus 2 meeting in 2013, Minister of Defense Chuck Hagel 
claimed, “More than half of Osprey trainings do not occur in Okinawa,” which 
suggests that the Marines are also training out of the island.350 The reality of decreasing 
Marines and frequent absence questions whether the physical presence of Marines can 
be considered as deterrence. More than the Marines themselves, the authors’ revelation 
suggests that the U.S.-Japan alliance itself acts as deterrence. 
Both Japanese and American, liberal and conservative, academics contributed to 
the debate against the militaristic necessity of the FRF. The threat of China, 
fundamental shortcomings of the proposed facilities and questionable contributions to 
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deterrence provides logistical arguments against the security concerns revolving 
around the Henoko plan. While these scholars have rejected the FRF, not all argued for 
relocating the base out of the prefecture; in fact, many believe in the necessity of 
relocating the base within is necessary for maintaining the functional role of the 
Marines.351 None of them also believe that relocating any of the bases out of Okinawa 
is plausible. However, the Center for Strategic & International Studies have conducted 
their own assessments and concluded, “No ‘Plan B’ would surpass the current FRF 
plan in terms of operational and political sustainability.”352 It is important, then, to 
observe government documents in order to question the FRF feasibility.  
For America and Japan, the FRF is “only solution that addresses operational, 
political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of Maine Corps 
Air Station Futenma.”353 However, it is questionable whether the FRF really is the only 
solution that solves the “operational, political, financial, and strategic” concerns of 
both governments. It is no secret that the Okinawa problem exists due to political 
differences. This tension has only worsened. Financially, landfill construction for the 
new FRF plan is estimated to cost around 231 billion and the overall cost to be over 
350 billion yen.354 While the landfill construction fee for the current FRF is 100 billion 
yen cheaper than the 2002 plan, additional years of demonstration and deliberation and 
                                                
351 Ogawa, 329-330; Eldridge, Who Kills Okinawa, 275-278; Mochizuki, “Deterrence and Marines 
on Okinawa,” in Yanagizawa et al., 125-127. 
352 Green et al., 56. 
353 U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing - September 21, 2015.” 
354 “Defense Minister estimates total cost of Henoko relocation at more than 350 billion yen 
[Henokosougouhi 3500 oku goe Boueisho ga keisan kouhyou],” Ryukyu Shimpo, last modified on March 
14, 2014, accessed on May 1, 2017, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/prentry-221327.html.  
 
124 
costs for environmental evaluation will diminish the difference between the two 
plans.355  
 If these two characteristics lack plausibility, observers may conclude that the 
operational and strategic explanations allow the FRF to be the best solution. The 
Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report argued that the 
FRF fulfills the necessities of the American military. Reported on 31 August 2010, the 
report concluded, “The V-way shaped configuration would support both peacetime and 
contingency operational capacity requirements.” 356  With representatives from the 
American Office of the Secretary of Defense and Department of State, American 
Military, Japanese Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cabinet 
Secretariat, both parties came to an agreement that the FRF would be a suitable 
substitute to the current air base. 
However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recently 
criticized both governments’ conclusion on the FRF’s operational capability. 
According to the GAO, the MCAS Futenma “support operations involving a variety of 
fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tilt-rotor aircraft... [and] also supports the use of a 
runway if needed for a United Nations contingency, such as disaster responses.”357 
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Although both governments have not criticized the shorter runway of the FRF in 
comparison to MCAS Futenma, the GAO criticized the agreed blueprint as 
problematic: 
Instead [of a 9,000-foot runway], there will be two 5,900-foot V-shaped runways 
that, according to Marine Corps officials, will be too short for certain aircraft. As 
we reported in March 1998 and is still the case based on our discussions with 
Marine Corps officials, the loss of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma’s runway 
equates to the loss of an emergency landing strip for fixed-wing aircraft in the 
area and the loss of the United Nations use of a runway. According to an official 
from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the office has not 
yet developed a plan for other alternate runways in Okinawa because it is not a 
priority.358 
 
As the congressional watchdog recorded, the FRF’s shorter runway cannot fully 
provide runways necessary for certain aircrafts, and there is no alternative announced 
yet. Another problem is the GAO’s revelation that a “Marine Corps and Pacific 
Command officials said the government of Japan is ultimately responsible for 
replacing the lost requirements by providing a longer runway elsewhere.”359 Currently, 
there is no evidence that the Japanese government plans to provide additional facilities 
out of the decided FRF framework. It is also highly unlikely that the governments 
would create an additional facility after claiming that the current framework is the 
“only solution.” However, if true, this would delegitimize the necessity of the FRF.  
If several problems question the FRF’s operational, political, financial, and 
strategic purposes, what justifies both governments to advocate for the FRF? Given 
that the past twenty years were devoted to negotiation and assessment, it is probably 
                                                                                                                             
Estimates,” last modified in April 2017, accessed on May 1, 2017, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683967.pdf, 21. 




politically preferable to remain with the current plan rather than negotiating a new 
location and causing turmoil elsewhere. Reanalysis would also be a political defeat of 
both governments and thus would make relocation elsewhere more difficult. Change in 
blueprints would also discard previous financial investment. Despite having a shorter 
runway as critiqued by the GAO, the FRF will still be able to operate as a facility for 
other aircrafts and the Ospreys. Most importantly, the relocation of the air base out of 
the crowded Futenma would be a palpable gesture of base reduction. 
Recent comments by the Japanese Minister of Defense reiterate concerns on the 
short runway. On 15 June 2017, Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada claimed that 
unless all eight conditions for return of Futenma base are not satisfied, the alliance 
could not return Futenma back to Okinawan jurisdiction. 360  Her statement is 
problematic due to the fourth condition of Futenma base’s reversion: “Improved 
contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be 
replicated at the FRF.”361 As of July 2017, discussions on the civilian facilities have 
not occurred. Therefore, as long as discussions do not occur, the stabilization of 
Futenma is possible. Given the likelihood of Okinawan demonstration against the 
usage of civilian facilities, it is possible for Futenma base to remain active beyond its 
intended reversion date. It is most likely that this civilian facility would be Naha 
Airport’s second runway, currently constructed under the second Abe administration as 
                                                
360 Ryota Nakamura, “Inada’s Rippling Comment: If conditions not met Futenma will “not be 
returned” [Inada shi hatsugen ga hamon Futenma henkan jyouken mitassei nara ‘henkan nashi’],” Ryukyu 
Shinpo, last modified on July 4, 2017, accessed on July 9, 2017, https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-
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one of his economic incentives. However, if the alliance eventually utilizes a civilian 
runway, the FRF cannot be justified to be a suitable replacement of MCAS Futenma. 
Therefore, the alliances’ argument of the FRF as the “only solution” in terms of 
operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns remains highly questionable. 
Criticism against the militaristic necessity of the FRF is abundant. The FRF’s 
insufficient runway length receives the greatest attention. In order to address this 
shortcoming, the government will most likely utilize a civilian facility, which will 
further increase burden on Okinawa. The worst-case scenario is the continued usage of 
Futenma base as their runway. Critics agree that within the prefecture cannot be 
compromised due to security necessities. However, base consolidation should be 
seriously considered. Difference of culture between marines and air force or aviation 
concerns may hinder the feasibility of merging MCAS Futenma’s facilities with 
another facility. Regardless, in order to complete relocation with Okinawan support, 
America will need to modify their conditions. American deliberation and obstinacy 
resulted as the 2006 FRF blueprint with a shorter runway than the original 2002 
proposal, which results in the inevitable usage of a civilian facility. The original spirit 
of lessening burden is lost in America’s current position on relocation. 
4.2. “Nokinawa”? Questioning Okinawa’s Low Win-set 
Reconsideration of conditions is also required from Okinawa. Security experts 
on both sides of the political spectrum argued that relocation out of the prefecture is 
implausible. If the alliance, especially the United States, should reconsider base 
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consolidation as an alternative, the Okinawans should also view this alternative as the 
solution. 
The current governor upholds the belief that Futenma should be unconditionally 
returned back to Okinawa.362 Statistics introduced in the thesis reconfirm Okinawa’s 
position against increasing base burden. This desire should not translate into a simple 
“no” to any alternative. Eldridge labels this phenomenon of perpetual resistance 
without constructive proposal as “Nokinawa”, an Okinawa that can only say “no.”363 
This label alone obscures the complexity of the issue, but raises an important point of 
consideration.  
The polls introduced in the thesis affirmed the fact that Okinawan’s understand 
the evolving security environment.364 The governor himself criticized the FRF as 
insufficient due to the lack of deterrence provided by the Henoko facility alone. If 
Okinawa believes in the necessity of bolstering security, it is important for Okinawa to 
find alternatives on the same line of argument. The alliance may reject Okinawan 
proposals, given that the new facility has already been approved. True resistance can 
be achieved by challenging the feasibility of the alliance’s limited conditions. With 
both conservatives and liberal academics arguing against the FRF’s militaristic 
feasibility, Okinawa could have diverted construction by proposing a militaristic 
alternative. 
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363 Eldridge, Okinawa Theory, 165. 
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4.3 The Impossible Compromise  
The information above suggests that the parties could have established changed 
their position. The rigid conditions of both parties, especially the United States of 
America, remain questionable. As shown in the thesis, the lack of agreeable conditions 
determined compromise to fail. Failure of achieving agreement should have resulted in 
a reevaluation of fundamental concerns. Rather than questioning and developing 
alternatives that guarantees one party’s conditions, stalemate should have resulted in 
internal evaluation. Lack of introspective criticism suggests that both parties had no 
intention to fasten the process of relocation. This resulted in the alliance’s threatening 
position of acceptance of Henoko or stabilization of Futenma, providing Okinawa a 





The alliance between the United States and Japan is important for security in 
East Asia, which has been referred by Prime Minister Abe as the alliance of hope. 
Unfortunately, the alliance of hope is challenged by the unsolved the MCAS Futenma 
relocation problem. The alliance extended the promised relocation by fifteen years 
beyond the initial agreement. The American and Japanese government continue to 
articulate the necessity of the bases in terms of security and burden reduction. However, 
Okinawan polls and the current governor’s speeches reveal that the residents do not 
share the same perspective as the government. The schism between the local and 
central governments reveal that both have not budged towards a compromise. 
Existing literature on the Okinawa problem fails to address the root of stalemate. 
Debate revolves around tangent issues. This thesis contributes to the debate by 
readdressing the fundamental reason behind the twenty-year delay. When observed 
through Putnam’s Two-Level Game Analysis, the Okinawa base problem can be seen 
as a fundamentally erroneous methodology of negotiation. Any form of agreement 
cannot be achieved when the two parties at negotiation have no interest of compromise. 
Would it have been better for the alliance to not propose MCAS Futenma’s 
relocation regardless of growing domestic and international attention on the atrocities 
of the American soldiers? The reality of military-caused crimes and accidents would 
inevitably coax the alliance to consider relocation. History reveals that the alliance had 
good intentions for Okinawa and desired to provide a facility that would genuinely 
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replace the air station. The problem is not the alliance’s proposal of relocating Futenma. 
The fundamental problem is the alliance’s misunderstanding of Okinawa’s burden and 
stance on relocation. The alliance must admit that their initial intention to “reduce the 
burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance” had 
failed. Continuing resistance for twenty years proves that Okinawa did not view the 
FRF in the same manner as the alliance. 
The Futenma relocation problem may come to an end sooner or later, given that 
the Supreme Court will strengthen the LDP’s justification for constructing Henoko 
base regardless of discontent or not. This does not mean that Okinawan resistance 
would end. The Okinawa base problem will continue to be a problem as long as 
alienation continues. The forcible construction of Henoko will not amend the 
deteriorated relations between the prefecture and the alliance. Even if the current delay 
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불가피한 교착상태:  오키나와현 후텐마 기지 이전에 
대한 투 레벨 게임 분석 
 
서울대학교  국제대학원 
국제학과 국제협력전공 
클렉스톤  다니엘 
 
1995 년 오키나와 성폭행 사건 이후, 일미 양 정부와 오키나와의 관계는 
걷잡을 수 없이 악화하였다. 1996 년 일미 정부는 오키나와의 불만 조정하기 
위해 후텐마 비행장을 헤노코에 있는 슈워브 캠프 (Camp Schwab) 가까이 
7 년 이내에 이전시키기로 합의했다. 하지만 20 년이 지나도록 이 합의는 
이루어지지 않고 있다. 오키나와 기지 이전 문제에 대한 기존 연구는 
사회·환경·안보 관점 중심으로 이 문제를 다루지만, 왜 이전합의가 지연되고 
있는지 실증적 분석을 하고 있지 않다. 
이 논문은 후텐마 기지 이전합의가 왜 20 년 동안 교착상태에 빠졌는지 
퍼트넘(Putnam)의 투 레벨 게임 이론을 적용하여 분석한다. 처음부터 
오키나와의 저항이 명확했음에도 불구하고 오키나와의 요구보다 안보를 
중시한 일미 양 정부는 오키나와와 협상을 시작하였다. 협의 이전의 오키나와 
저항은 처음부터 합의 가능성이 낮았다는 것을 시사한다. 그러므로 협상은 
오래 걸릴 수 밖에 없었고 합의하기 어려웠다.  
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